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THE AMERICAN REVIEW

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ONE RUPEE

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Contemporary articles of opinion



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THE BOWSPRIT

The shadowy terrors occurring in China today move us to wonder what might have happened if the leaders of rebellion, 200 years ago, had chosen a biological figure of speech to express their revolt against injustice. They elected instead the mechanical analogies to violent destruction of tottering structures: Smash, clear away the debris, build anew on firm foundations.

How many intellectuals would have rejected an unholy alliance with the mob if they had been taught instead to think of human progress in the images of living things?

Human society has never moved ahead by destruction, hatred, suspicion, and aggression, but by the selection of new seeds; the grafting of new ideas on old roots; the careful tending of orderly procedure; the slow growth of law, knowledge, techniques; the transplanting of old values into new soil; the selective removal of social weeds; the worldwide winds of scientific interdependence; the gentle rains of international responsibility; defence against predators; reduction of parasites; the nurture of social organisms; and the growth of colour, form, and variety.

If intellectuals, a century ago, had adopted

these biological figures of speech, the world might have escaped the bestiality of the mobs which perpetrated the Paris Commune; the liquidation of the Kulaks; the massacre of 100,000 Indonesians; and the contemporary horrors in China.

Genko Uchida, in "Technology in China" written before the Chinese paroxysm began, describes what China had done to nourish its own garden. What destruction has been wrought since then, what hopes there may be for new growth when the sword again becomes the sickle cannot now be known.

Among the commentators upon American life, many have been outsiders. Sometimes penetrating, sometimes merely irritating, from de Tocqueville to the present a steady stream of visitors has come, seen, and had its say.

It now appears that it is India's turn to be the cynosure of scholars, critics, and tourists. This issue of *The American Review* is witness, in part, to America's interest in India.

Stanley A. Kochanek leads off, in "The Indian National Congress," with a detailed analysis of the shifting relation between the Congress Party and the Parliament. Although his account ends before Shastri's death, it provides an informative background against which to view the results of the recent election.

Americans are more or less aware of the historical factors which have created differences in the economic, social, and political behaviour of different regions of the United States—especially as between South and North. *Dr. Albert Franklin*, in "South India: An Ancient Culture Faces Change," provides an American's analysis of some of the factors which underlie the distinctions between South and North in India.

Many readers of *The Times of India* have come to know of *James Reston's* searing comments on con-

temporary U.S. policy. In a more benevolent mood he undertakes an estimate of Lyndon B. Johnson and his place in history in "Johnson and the Age of Reform."

William Jay Smith, during the last ten years, has risen to a place at the top among American poets. The "Five Poems" reproduced here are selected from his most recent book *The Tin Can and Other Poems*. "Northern Lights" displays his capacity for lyric beauty; "Dachshunds," for irony; "The Antimacassar" and the "Barge Bird," for social satire; and "Pidgin Pinch," for savage commentary.

Jacob Sloan, editor, writer, and literary critic, compares an Indian and an American author facing similar characters. How many of our readers see a parallel between Augie March and Raju?

The tables are turned in "Mementoes of a Visit to America." An Indian artist-archaeologist, *Vishnu Wakankar*, covering the continent in giant strides, flicks on to paper his impressions of America.

In the January issue of *The American Review*, Norman Bailey discussed some of the implications of the widespread ownership of American corporation shares. In this issue *Victor R. Fuchs*, in "The First Service Economy," describes the even more revolutionary implications of the rapid increase in professional and service employment to all aspects of American economic, political, and social life.

—R.R.R.B.

TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA

GENKO UCHIDA

[Despite the intense political and paramilitary struggles which have occurred in China since this article was written, it continues to be of interest as an analysis of the economic background against which the power struggle has been waged.—Editor.]

WHAT PROGRESS ARE THE CHINESE MAKING in technology and industrialization?

The fact that mainland China accounts for a fifth of the world's population is sufficient reason for worldwide interest in this question. As next-door neighbours of China we in Japan, of course, are more interested than most people. Three years ago I began a systematic study with the object of obtaining a detailed estimate of China's technical development.

Measuring a nation's technical progress is at best a difficult problem. In China's case the immensity of the country and the secretiveness of her government magnify the difficulty; the task

seems comparable to trying to guess the number of beans in an opaque bottle. The problem is not, however, completely insoluble. China's own statements and her intercourse with the industrial world outside provide enough clues to allow a well-based appraisal of the state of her technology.

We Japanese are in a particularly good position to measure China's progress because in the past twenty years we travelled the road over which China is now labouring. Twenty years ago Japan was a backward country with a per capita income of less than \$100; today our per capita income is well over \$500—the milestone that divides the advanced countries from the backward—and Japan is recognized as one of the world's most modern industrialized nations. By comparing China's present development in various sectors with the stages in our own history we can estimate how far China has come along the road.

I shall present here a brief review of China's stated technical goals and policies, her problems and the extent of her advancement in key industries. I must emphasize that my conclusions are only estimates derived from fragmentary information, not the kind of precise evaluation that is possible in countries where the essential technological and economic facts are fully known.

China: More "Developing" than Communist

One should understand at the outset that, although the most conspicuous aspect of modern China is her system of communistic control, in a fundamental sense she is more a "developing" country than a communistic one. That is to say, her economic policies are rooted primarily in her needs as a still poor, backward nation. This may help to explain why her views on Marxism and communism differ in some respects from those of the more advanced U.S.S.R. It also accounts for the extremely aggressive, evangelistic role adopted by the Chinese central government in directing the development of the national economy.

In a country seeking to transform itself rapidly from the primitive, impoverished state to a modern industrial power, patriotic zeal and strong central control over the economy are indispensable.

Naturally, zeal has tended to run far ahead of capability. Under the lash of experience the overall approach of China's leaders towards industrialization has undergone an evolution that is subtly reflected in the changing slogans they have used to exhort the people.

They began with a simple appeal: "Catch up and overtake."

They believed that by heroic efforts their immense, determined country could soon establish a modern industrial economy and outdo the advanced nations of the West. To that end they threw all the capital and labour they could command into the industrialization sector. They soon learned that this was a self-defeating policy. *It took too much labour and capital from the agricultural sector and thus left the population intolerably short of food.*

Furthermore, the Chinese leaders (like the politically oriented leaders in most developing countries) had underestimated the importance of technical know-how. They had failed to realize that industrialization requires not only capital and a work force but also an adequate staff of technically trained personnel who understand the machines. Without this third essential element much of the capital and labour was wasted.

Priority for Agriculture and Independence for Industry

The agricultural problem was compounded by three years of bad weather (between 1959 and 1962) that ruined crops. The Chinese Government shifted to greater emphasis on the agricultural sector and introduced a new slogan: "Stable production and more crops." Meanwhile, China had been hit by another unexpected setback. As a result of the Chinese criticisms of Russian leaders, the U.S.S.R. suddenly withdrew its technical advisers and workers from China in August 1960.

The factories under construction and those already in operation were left without skilled personnel. Faced with the necessity of training her own people to complete the construction projects and run the factories, the Chinese Government issued a new slogan: "Self-development." From 1960 on, China depended largely on her own resources for training engineers, technicians, and researchers.

She became timid and notably suspicious in her dealings with other countries, Communist or non-Communist, friendly or unfriendly. Her feeling was that those with whom she could trade were out to "pick her clean." For this feeling there was some justification, as some of the equipment China had bought from Communist countries turned out to be obsolescent.

The Chinese Government in recent years has insisted on buying only the latest models of equipment, often overlooking the fact that the newest models are not necessarily the best for China's own needs.

The Chinese also ask for a two-year or three-year supply of spare parts for the equipment, fearing that in the event of an increase in international tension the suppliers might refuse to deliver parts. All in all, the Chinese suspicion of foreigners is so strong and the drive for self-reliance so determined that there is a general reluctance to use foreign machinery at all.

Science and Technology

China today has a well-organized establishment for the direction of science and technology. At the policy level it is headed by a Science and Technology Commission in the Chinese Department of State. Under this commission are many bureaus, bearing names such as the General Agency, the International Cooperation Bureau, the Standards Bureau, and the Fourth Bureau, whose responsibility is the needs of the manufacturing industries.

The control of research work itself is centred in the National Science Department, the Chinese version of the U.S.S.R.'s Academy of Sciences. This department maintains about 100 research institutes, employing a total of about 7,000 investigators who work on research projects assigned by the government. The department's head is Kuo Mo-jo; he is also president of the National Institute of Science and Technology, which was established for the education of engineers, particularly in the fields of atomic research and electronics.

The new generation of engineers that China is producing is an impressive national asset. The profession is not limited to men; it is attracting increasing numbers of women. China's young engineers are confident, ambitious, eager to learn. They are acquiring, mainly from foreign publications, a detailed theoretical knowledge of the latest advances in technology. The Chinese engineering establishment is still weak, however, in two crucial requirements: seasoned leadership and the resourcefulness that can come only from practical experience.

In an industrialized country the engineers are imbued by education and job experience with a generalized expertise that enables them to cope with a wide range of tasks and with new problems as they arise. In addition to their specific training, they have automatically absorbed a fund of basic knowledge and skills—one may call it a common sense—that is the heritage of the nation's industrial traditions.

China, of course, lacks such traditions or such a "common

sense." Her engineers' knowledge is largely theoretical; the questions they ask of foreign engineers often betray a naïveté that shows lack of experience in applying the theories. The lack of practical experience has led China's leaders into some serious errors in industrial policy.

Errors of Imitation

Let me cite a few errors that we Japanese can appreciate because they repeat lessons we learned ourselves on the road to industrialization. One lesson has to do with imitation. It is natural, and indeed inevitable, for a developing country to begin by copying the products of advanced industrial countries. Unfortunately there are grave pitfalls in such a policy. First of all, one had better be careful about what one selects for copying.

A case in point is an agricultural machine China began to produce a few years ago. It was copied from a machine that had been designed and produced by a small manufacturer in Japan. After a year or so the Chinese found that the machine was poorly designed—and that the Japanese manufacturer who had produced it had gone into bankruptcy. China lacked this automatic corrective; once the model was put on the production line, politics and bureaucracy made it very difficult to stop.

Other instances of unwise imitation can be cited. A Chinese instrument-producing plant lavished great care on the production of a laboratory oscillograph it had copied from a foreign make, but all efforts to get the instrument to work well failed because it was badly designed. At a trade show in Tokyo the Chinese displayed an automobile they had copied from a twenty-year-old model of a Western car; by loading it with air conditioning and other new equipment, they had made the sedan as heavy as a small dump truck!

Another pitfall inherent in imitation is that it retards the development of a capability for design. China requires detailed designs to accompany all the equipment she buys from foreign countries so that she can copy the equipment in her own factories. She has succeeded in copying many sophisticated machine tools of the U.S.S.R., Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, and Japan. This itself is no small achievement.

Yet although China has developed high skill in copying designs, she has not developed much ability to improve on them or to design new machinery of her own. Indeed, I have seen no evidence that

any factory in China has a research and development division for the design of new products.

Japan herself went through a period of industrial copying that gave her the reputation of being an "imitator." She soon recognized, however, that the development of a technology of design was itself an essential step towards full industrialization, and she hastened this stage by purchasing expertise from abroad. China now seems to be coming to the same realization; she has begun to seek technical assistance and knowledge from non-Communist countries.

Imbalance in Output

A second mistake in policy that has victimized China is the "production first" slogan, or what is called in the U.S. the "crash programme." This is the policy of putting all the available resources to work at any cost to turn out some article for which there is an urgent need.

For example, the Chinese at one point found there was an acute shortage of steel angle irons for agricultural development, and all the steel factories were therefore ordered to make angle irons, whether or not they had efficient equipment for doing so. The result was a deluge of angle irons and a sharp reduction in the country's total industrial output.

This lack of balance or planned programming has been characteristic of Chinese factories and of the overall economy. Japan learned the necessity of harmonizing production in the various sectors of the economy twenty years ago. It appears that the leaders of China have now learned the same lesson and are beginning to apply it.

Chinese technology shows many signs of severe imbalance. For example, the country is mass-producing agricultural machinery but has not yet persuaded the farmers to make full use of it. China is building many dams and hydroelectric plants. However, because she has not mastered the technology of control of river systems, there are often harmful repercussions upstream from the dams. China's factories are producing machine tools of excellent design but so poor in the quality of the materials that their reliability is far below standard.

The manufacturing industry as a whole is backward in the sense that it lacks the base of feeder industries for making parts and components. The plants producing final products (for instance,

the leading factory for building trucks) must make their own nuts and bolts. A factory that makes electrical measuring instruments assigns a considerable proportion of its 4,000 workers to turning out precision screws on bench lathes and to die-casting metal parts. A plant that produces testing machines must build its own oil pumps.

In short, the unorganized structure of China's industry and technology is a severe obstacle to the development of high special skills and efficient production. Chinese industrial leaders are now taking steps towards establishment of a parts industry: they have built a pilot project in the Shenyang area of Manchuria around heavy-machinery and machine-tool factories. From Japan's experience it must be said that the full integration of satellite parts plants into the industrial system as a whole will take a long time.

The "Human Sea" Technique

To round off this discussion of general approach and policies, I shall merely mention one other simple but fundamental lesson that Japan learned some time ago and that China's leaders now begin to show signs of appreciating. A populous country is tempted to believe any project, however formidable, can be accomplished if one only puts enough people to work on it—the "human sea" idea.

This method has been demonstrated as working wonders in circumstances such as the restoration of a bombed road in wartime with only human hands as tools, but it is certainly an unsound one for building an industrial system or a modern civilized society. Man is not an ant. China, with all her hundreds of millions of people, is now turning to emphasize on modern tools—mechanization and automation—for building her society.

Plant Management

For the specific measurement of China's technical progress so far, let us look at three basic industries: (1) iron and steel, (2) chemicals, and (3) machinery, including consumer machines such as automobiles and electronic devices. I wish to remark here that in this evaluation we cannot take production figures alone as our guide. In China the rate of industrial production is heavily conditioned by the structure and quality of management and by the prevailing attitude towards productivity, which are still in a

highly primitive stage.

Each factory is more or less autonomous, and the plant is run by a quadrumvirate consisting of the manager, the chief engineer, the workers' labour union, and a Communist party representative who is responsible for education of the workers. Thus the plant management is democratic but not particularly conducive to rapid decisions, flexibility in innovation, or efficiency of operation. The manager usually has little training in the special techniques of management.

Moreover, Chinese policies have given scant regard to production efficiency. The net result is that the productivity of labour in China's industries is very low: it averages only about a tenth to a fifth of the productivity of workers in Japan. Presumably the skill of management and production efficiency in China will grow as her industries advance in size and sophistication. In any case, what we are concerned with here is not the question of efficiency but the state of China's industrial techniques, or engineering, as the measure of her technological progress.

Iron and Steel

China's iron and steel industry is a mixture of large-scale and small-scale operations, of modern methods and primitive ones. In her hurry to industrialize, the new Chinese nation urged the farmers to turn to making iron and steel in their spare time. Some 400,000 small shops, hardly more than smelting sheds, sprouted all over the country. This effort proved to be so inefficient and so injurious to agriculture that only about 300 of the small mills are now operating. They supply, however, about a third of China's pig iron and steel, and they remain politically important because they enable farmers to contribute to the nation's industrialization.

Before World War II China had five large steel plants, located in Shanghai, Tientsin, Dairen, and two other cities in Manchuria near Dairen. These five accounted for nearly ninety per cent of the country's iron and steel production. Today there are twenty large iron and steel combines, or producing centres, distributed in central and southern China as well as in the northeast.

Their blast furnaces for iron production are large, but they do not employ the high-pressure oxygen technique of the most modern furnaces. In the production of steel the Chinese mills are limited to the open-hearth-furnace technique without oxygen; they have not yet come to the liquid-oxygen converters or the large electric

furnaces that are now being installed in advanced countries.

China's rolling mills for processing steel are mostly imports from the U.S.S.R. and East Germany that are not up to date and are operated by control instruments that had to be improvised by Chinese engineers, since the Russian technicians left in the midst of the installation of the mill machinery. The Chinese plants have no strip-milling equipment. Nor are they yet able to produce or process high-grade special steels (such as stainless steel) in any substantial quantity.

On the whole, I estimate that in steel technology China today is about fifteen years behind Japan (which is the world's third-largest producer of iron and steel, behind the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.). It is quite possible that China, as a larger country, will achieve her goal of passing Japan and becoming third in total steel production by 1973, but that does not mean she will have caught up in technology.

If she depends only on her own resources, it will take her considerably more than six years to develop her own strip mills and reach the present world standards in modernization of steelmaking. In this connection it should be remarked that China has recently signed a contract with several companies in West Germany to obtain a complete rolling mill for the production of thick steel plates.

Chemical Production

In chemical technology also, China is about fifteen years behind. There, too, her development is repeating Japan's history. *In a developing country the first chemical industries to receive attention are those required for the production of fertilizers.* Acids (principally sulfuric acid for fertilizers) and alkalis (comprising two main industries: soap and detergents and soda, which supplies raw materials for glass) come next.

China's fertilizer industry is already sizable: she produces some 7.5 million tons of chemical fertilizer a year. This is still far short of her needs, however. Although she adds to her own production by importing upward of four million tons a year (which makes her the world's largest importer of fertilizer), her total supply amounts to only twelve pounds per acre of cultivated land—about a tenth of the amount used per acre in Japan.

Moreover, her production consists mostly of ammonium sulfate and includes only negligible amounts of urea and high-grade compound fertilizers that are now in common use in Western countries.

It appears that unless China obtains substantial help from outside it will take at least five to ten years to raise her agricultural productivity to a level at which it can provide her with sufficient capital for a major breakthrough in industrialization.

From Japan's experience it can be predicted that China's next stage in the development of chemical industries will be based principally on the extraction of products from coal tar. Like prewar Japan, China still depends on coal as her main fuel (although large oil fields are reported to have been discovered recently in Manchuria). From coal tar the principal products one can obtain are dyestuffs, drugs, and gunpowder.

There is evidence that China is already launched on the "tar age" in chemical production. She has begun to produce pesticides in substantial quantities for her agriculture, and we can reasonably guess, even without specific information, that she is not neglecting explosives production.

After the tar age comes the age of synthesis, meaning the production of new chemicals from basic raw materials. Japan entered this stage only twenty years ago, after World War II. China, although still in the early phases of the tar age, has made a beginning in the establishment of synthetics industries. She has been able to do this by importing complete plants from abroad.

The Chinese chemical industry is now producing perhaps 60,000 to 70,000 tons of plastics a year, including some 25,000 tons of vinyl chloride and small amounts of synthetic fibres such as rayon and nylon. China does not have a synthetic rubber industry of any consequence, partly because she readily obtains natural rubber from Indonesia and Malaysia and partly because her total use of rubber (about 1.5 million tons a year) is still relatively small, only about half the amount used in Japan.

In oil refining and the production of petrochemicals China is held back, as are all but the most advanced countries, by the fact that modern, large-scale operation in this field depends entirely on automation. Like some other developing countries, however, China has recently made a beginning by entering into contracts to buy oil refining plants (from Italy, West Germany, and France in her case).

China is making an effort to speed up development of a wide spectrum of chemical industries by buying plants of various types from Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Experience has shown, however, that a country cannot make great progress in industrialization until it has

acquired the ability to build its own equipment. Japan reached that stage a decade ago and has since become the world's third-largest producer of synthetic fibres, oil refinery products, and petrochemicals.

China is now taking the first steps towards such self-reliance in chemical technology. For a vinyl chloride factory in Peking the Chinese constructed the carbide electric furnaces, electrolytic chlorine cells, equipment for the synthesis of chloric acid, and equipment for the synthesis and refining of the monomers that are linked to make vinyl chloride.

They had to import from West Germany, however, the polymerization equipment that joins the monomers into the final product. The polymerization division has 2,700 employees, which seems a very large number, but the management explains that most of them are trainees who will staff new plants to be built soon.

Production of Machinery

Obviously the clearest index to a nation's industrial development is the state of its machinery industry, because this must supply the tools for all other industries. In the production of machines China presents a mixed picture: she is well advanced in some fields, far behind in others.

As in the chemical industry, *in launching a machinery industry a developing country's first concern must be the needs of agriculture.*

The Chinese have put great emphasis on the production of farm tractors. A single large factory in Loyang is turning out 300 to 400 45-horsepower tractors a month, plus some power shovels and graders. The production cost of the tractors is reported to be about \$10,000 apiece—thirty to forty per cent higher than the standard in industrialized countries.

To Japan, which produces tractors mainly for construction jobs rather than for agriculture, *China's investment in tractor production seems disproportionately large, since labour-saving in farming is less urgent than increasing the productivity of the soil.*

In addition to her tractor factories, China has a great number of small factories throughout the country producing other agricultural machines and implements. She has also developed a substantial industry in the manufacture of pumps, which are used to a large extent for agriculture.

A pump factory in Shanghai is mass-producing about 2,000 rotary pumps a month. In size (up to 1,600 millimetres in

diameter) and design (applying the latest hydrodynamic theories) the pumps are quite modern, and so is the equipment employed in producing them, except for the final testing instruments.

One of the early requirements for an industrializing country is the production of machinery for transportation—a vital necessity for the exchange of products between the agricultural and industrial sectors. When Japan started to produce railroad rolling stock some ninety years ago, it took her nearly twenty years to reach the industrial nations' technical level in this field at the time.

China began to build locomotives fifteen years ago and is now reported to be producing almost all her supply of these machines in her own shops.

In shipbuilding, an industry Japan developed within twenty years in the nineteenth century, China lags, primarily because she has relatively little foreign trade and depends mainly on overland and inland-waterway transport within her own country. She has no facilities yet for building a ship of more than 12,000 tons and lacks modern techniques such as the block-building system or construction of giant tankers.

Transport machinery in a modern industrial system also includes trucks and automobiles, but this industry requires a higher level of development. China does not yet have an automotive industry in the modern sense.

Machine Tools

After the initial development of elementary machines for agriculture and transport, the next stage for an industrializing country is the production of machine tools and major power sources, which entails the making of boilers, turbines, and heavy electrical machinery.

China has entered this second stage. As I have mentioned, many of her factories are equipped with modern machine tools that were imported from various countries: East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. China herself is only beginning, however, to produce machine tools of her own, and her progress so far is very uneven. Her output of tools of the grinding class, for example, is good, but her boring tools are far below standard.

We can estimate the level of the Chinese machine-tool industry by noting that it does not produce transfer machines, roll grinders or jig borers and it cannot turn out really large machines; the boring

machines are limited to 150 millimetres (about six inches), hobbing machines to 2,500 millimetres, vertical boring and turning lathes to 6,000 millimetres, and planomillers to 3,000 millimetres.

China's dependence on foreign machine tools has held back her own education and practice in the design of such tools, but on the other hand it bestows the advantage that her engineers are not inhibited by experience. They can boldly explore unorthodox approaches. For example, in a machine-tool factory in Shanghai they have put all the operations, from machining of the various parts to final assembly, in one huge, temperature-controlled room—perhaps the largest room in the world for making machine tools. With increasing sophistication in the techniques and synthesis of the various operations, this room might eventually turn out the world's best machine tools.

Judging from the history of our own machine-tool industry in Japan, we can estimate that China is about fifteen years behind in this field, but with the importation of foreign know-how she might easily catch up in a decade. Much the same conclusion applies to her production of heavy electrical machinery. China has built a turbogenerator of the high-temperature, high-pressure type with a capacity of 30,000 kilowatts—a position Japan reached fifteen years ago. We are now building 500,000-kilowatt generators; presumably it will take China a similar period to reach that level.

Automobiles and Trucks

The production of automobiles requires not only a high level of specific techniques for their fabrication but also a highly integrated industrial structure bringing together a diversity of industries. Many different enterprises contribute to the making and running of an automobile: a wide variety of materials (including fuel) and of parts (including many specialized instruments). All of these must be supplied in reliable quantity and quality. Presumably the lack of such diversity and industrial organization is the main reason China has not yet even attempted to create an automotive industry.

She has only one mass-production plant in this field: a factory in Changchun that turns out 2,000 trucks a month. It can be estimated that from this infant stage it will take China more than twenty years to develop an industry capable of producing automobiles comparable to those of the advanced countries. The same is true of her production of aircraft. She has begun to produce

small planes by herself, but almost all are complete copies of Russian models.

In electronics, a field in which Chinese leaders are now showing keen interest, China has not yet gone much further than investigations in the laboratory. About the only device she has put into production is a transistor radio incorporating low-grade germanium transistors.

She is not far advanced in research on the technology of digital computers, but it is reported that her laboratories have recently built some analogue computers. No doubt China will give increasing attention to electronics in the coming years, because of its great importance from the standpoint of automating her industries and developing communications over her large territory.

Comparative Development: China and Japan

If we take Japan to be typical of the modern industrialized country, then by nearly all the indexes China is ten to fifteen years behind in technology. It is a striking fact that the Japanese engineers who have visited China recently have in almost every case found Chinese engineers today confronted with the same problems Japan attacked about fifteen years ago. Since China seems to be repeating our history technologically, we can perhaps also make a forecast of her likely development in economic terms.

In 1950 Japan's income as a nation was \$9.3 billion, amounting to \$93 per capita. She soon passed the level of \$100 per capita, and thereafter she was able to devote an average of about thirty per cent of her annual gross national product to capital investment; in 1961 she actually allocated forty-three per cent of her G.N.P. to expanding her productive capacity.

This high rate of investment enabled the nation to generate a growth rate of ten to twenty per cent a year in G.N.P. By 1965 her national income had risen to \$62 billion or \$620 per capita. In fifteen years it had multiplied sevenfold.

China's present national income is estimated to be about \$100 per capita, or \$60 billion in total for her estimated 600 million population. Most of that income, of course, comes from agriculture, but she has entered the industrialization stage. If she follows the experience of Japan, she will soon accumulate enough technical knowledge and capital to make a breakthrough into a period of rapid economic growth, a growth that is driven by industrial investment. In ten to fifteen years she might attain a per capita income

equal to Japan's present figure (\$620). In that case China's gross national income would be about seventy per cent as large as that of the U.S.

How far off is the impending breakthrough for China? My own estimate is five to ten years. One may wonder, of course, whether the recent political convulsions in China will affect this timetable. In this connection I shall observe that Japan suffered from similar political instability in the years before World War II. Thereafter the pace of her progress towards industrialization was quicker.

GENKO UCHIDA is *International Economic Secretary in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan*. He is also a member of the ministry's *China Study Group*.

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The Distribution of Power Between Party and Government

STANLEY A. KOCHANEK

IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY with a single dominant party the distribution of power within the party is of critical importance to the maintenance of democratic processes and political responsibility. The implications of such a system are particularly acute in the new nations of Asia and Africa where the dominant party has grown out of a nationalist movement and where problems of national unity have resulted frequently in a tendency to view the party and the state as synonymous.

In India, the leadership of the National Congress was acutely aware of the problem of defining the role of the mass organization in relation to the new function of the party as government. Nehru, in particular, was convinced that functional separation of party and government was essential to democracy in India.

Describing the Indian situation, he said:

It is basically the government policy and the implementation of that policy that affects the people. The Congress comes in not only in broadly effecting that policy or pushing it in this direction or that, but much more so in carrying the message of that policy to the people. . . .¹

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Nehru consistently held that the party organization could not expect the Prime Minister and his Government to be directly responsible to the party executive. "The Prime Minister or a Chief Minister," he noted,

is the archstone which forms the basis of a democratic structure. Once he is chosen he must have the full discretion left to him. If he does not command the confidence of the legislature, he must go.

However, the Prime Minister's responsibility to the legislature did not extend to the party organization. Nehru considered it wholly unjustified to expect the Prime Minister to hold his post only so long as the party executive permitted him to remain in office. To do so, he argued, would reduce parliamentary democracy to a "mockery."²

During the Nehru era therefore the executive organs of the Congress mass organization, which had been the centre of power in the pre-independence period, found to their frustration that their role had been undercut. In the years following the formation of the Interim Government in 1946, the mass organization was gradually subordinated to the needs of the new role of the party as government.

Although the relationship has been modified somewhat since Nehru's death, it is essential to understand the relationship established during the Nehru era before undertaking speculations about the future.

The development of the relationship between the mass organization of the Congress and the Congress Government can be seen most effectively by an examination of the stages by which Prime Minister Nehru and his Cabinet came to dominate and subordinate the two major power positions in the party organization—the Congress presidency and the Working Committee.

The Congress President as National Unity

Throughout the Indian independence struggle, the office of Congress President symbolized the unity of India as a national entity. The holder of the office was called *Rashtrapati*, a term now also applied to the constitutional head of the Indian state.

Under Mahatma Gandhi's reorganization of the Congress the emblematic significance of the office was enhanced still further.

The Congress President, as first among equals, became the head of the powerful Working Committee, and the office rotated among the great national figures of the Gandhian era—Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and Maulana Azad.

In 1946, as the struggle for independence was drawing to a close, the Congress—upon Gandhi's recommendation—elected Nehru Congress President to carry out the final phases of negotiations with the British. Shortly after his election, the new Congress President was asked by the Viceroy to form an Interim Government. Nehru accepted the invitation and formed a cabinet in which the members of the inner circle of the Working Committee were given key positions.

With the formation of the Interim Government, the decision-making organs of the party no longer held the centre of the political arena. Nehru, wishing to provide for a separation of the functions of party and government, resigned from the office of Congress President. Thereafter, the presidency was entrusted to a group of less prestigious organizational leaders who, despite several attempts, could not subordinate the Congress Government to the dictates of the mass organization.

After a brief period of struggle, the locus of power became centred in the Nehru Government and election to the office of Congress President became a relatively hollow honour. The Congress President's role was confirmed as that of party chairman, who though still elected *de jure* was the *de facto* appointee of the Prime Minister and responsible largely for the day-to-day administration of the party machine.

FOUR PHASES

During this transformation, which corresponded with and contributed materially to the subordination of the party to the government, the role of the Congress President passed through several distinct phases.

1. The first phase, extending from 1946 to 1951, was a period of conflict and transition. The office of Congress President was held by four men, two of whom, having attempted to challenge the supremacy of the parliamentary wing, were forced to resign.

2. The second phase, which lasted from 1951 to 1954, was marked by the total dominance of the Prime Minister. Nehru, reversing his earlier stand, attempted to prevent serious conflict between party and government by assuming the office of Congress

President.

3. The decade lasting from 1954 to 1964 marked the third phase in the transformation of the Congress presidency. During this period, the Congress organization was headed by a series of young leaders who presided over the day-to-day affairs of the organization under the supervision of their senior colleagues in the government.

4. The election of Kamaraj Nadar in 1964 may mark the beginning of a fourth phase of development the barest outlines of which are now becoming evident.

Phase One

Though the first phase in the post-independence evolution of the Congress President's role comprised only five years, it proved to be a period of acutely painful adjustment for both the Congress and its leaders. Nehru's decision to resign as Congress President in order to head the Interim Government and his decision to appoint most of the inner circle of Working Committee members to the Cabinet forced Gandhi to turn to the second echelon of Congress leaders in order to find a Congress President. Again, as in Nehru's decision to resign the Congress presidency, the assumption was that a separation between party and government function was essential.

Acharya Kripalani: Painful Readjustment

Acharya Kripalani was the man Gandhi selected. Kripalani had been permanent secretary of the Congress for almost a decade. Since he had also been closely connected with constructive work in the field of education, his experience seemed to make him an ideal choice to rebuild a debilitated Congress organization.

Yet, the case turned out to be exactly the opposite. Kripalani's long and intimate association with the Congress central office had had a profound effect upon his conception of the potential importance of the party organization and its chief executive in policy-making for the nation.

During his tenure as Congress President, such views brought him into frequent conflict with his senior colleagues in the government, for Kripalani insisted that all important decisions made by the Congress members of the Interim Government should be reached only in consultation with the Congress President and the

Working Committee.

By contrast, Nehru, Patel, and other senior Congressmen in the government consented only to inform the Congress President and the Working Committee of events. The party executive, they argued, should play a role in shaping long-range goals, but the government could not be expected to consult the party organization on the whole range of immediate and specific problems confronting it at any one time. Party-government discord over procedural questions was accompanied and exacerbated by a series of clashes over substantive issues brought by partition.

When the government refused to yield to Kripalani's demands for procedural and substantive changes, he decided to resign from the Congress presidency. By this time, Kripalani had already lost the confidence of his colleagues in the government.

Kripalani had envisioned a dominant decision-making role for the party organization. In doing so, he failed to recognize the significance of the formation of the Interim Government and the shift in the locus of power implicit in the decision of the old high command of the Congress to join that government.

The uniqueness of the new role of the Congress as government left Kripalani with no clear boundaries for his office. Acting on his own assumption that the Congress organization and its President would be playing the supreme role, Kripalani came into conflict with the leaders of the new government.

Having lost the battle, Kripalani had no choice but to resign. In doing so, he established the first precedent for the supremacy of the Congress Government over the mass organization.

Rajendra Prasad: Three Major Events

The selection of Kripalani's successor was complicated by the inability of the big three of the Congress—Nehru, Patel, and Gandhi—to agree on a single candidate. Gandhi, wishing to head off the threat of a Socialist secession from the Congress, recommended Narendra Dev, a Congress Socialist, as Kripalani's successor, but Patel's anti-socialist bias caused him to reject the proposal.

Though Nehru agreed with Gandhi's choice, he felt compelled to cooperate with Patel in finding a man who, first and foremost, could be counted upon to reduce party-government friction. He therefore joined Patel in persuading one of their ministerial colleagues, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, to become Congress President.³

At the time of his election, Prasad was Food Minister in the

Nehru Cabinet. Once elected Congress President, however, Prasad resigned from the government. Two factors conditioned his decision. First, he felt that the post required his undivided attention.⁴ Second, he and his cabinet colleagues argued that the functions of the party and government should be kept separate. "The policy," he once wrote, "has always been not to mix up the office of the government with that of our Congress organization."⁵

Prasad's tenure as Congress President was short. It was essentially an interim arrangement designed to meet the immediate challenge to the government posed by Kripalani's resignation. Yet, during this period of about a year, three major events took place: Gandhi was assassinated, the Congress Socialists left the party, and friction between Nehru and Patel caused a realignment of forces within the Congress, the reverberations of which were felt when the time came to select the President for the Jaipur Session of the Congress in 1948.

Despite their own increasingly divergent opinions on party and government policies, both Nehru and Patel encouraged Prasad to remain as President in order to insure the continuance of the party-government harmony which had subsisted during his tenure; but Prasad insisted that his health would no longer permit him to shoulder the burdens of the office.⁶

When Prasad remained firm in his decision, Nehru and Patel, deprived of the mediating influence of Gandhi, were unable to agree on a candidate to replace him. As a result, the stage was set for an open struggle among the junior leaders of the party.

Though the contestants for the post of President in 1948 were sharply divided on ideological, sectional, and organizational goals, the issue most debated was the distribution of power in the Congress. This issue was brought into particularly clear focus when Kripalani announced that he would be a candidate for the office from which he had resigned less than a year before.

In his role as Congress President and as a senior Congress leader, Rajendra Prasad was deeply concerned about how Kripalani's surprise announcement would affect the party-government relationship. Therefore, arguing that his presence in the race would create the impression that the party lacked confidence in the government, Prasad advised Kripalani to withdraw immediately.⁷ "Your election," he told Kripalani,

can have only one of two interpretations. Either people may think that your views have been accepted by the bulk

of the Congressmen in the country and you are reinstated to your old position because the Congress repudiates the action of the All-India Congress Committee which accepted your resignation and in a way shows its want of confidence in the Government for the attitude it adopted towards you [,] or the other interpretation may be that there has been no change in the position at all but that you yourself have given up that attitude and are elected more or less after expressing your repentance at least by implication of what you did. I do not think either position is good. It is not in the interest of the country to do anything which might leave an impression that there is a difference between the Congress and the Ministry and the Congress has given a slap to the Ministry. . . .

Kripalani was left with little choice but to comply with Prasad's request. He withdrew.

Pattabhi Sitaramayya: Cooperation

With Kripalani out of the race, a major contest developed between Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya of Andhra and Purshottamdas Tandon of Uttar Pradesh. Feeling that the sectional interests of the South deserved consideration, Prasad tried desperately but unsuccessfully to secure the uncontested election of Sitaramayya.⁸

During the campaign that followed, Tandon claimed the backing of Patel,⁹ while Pattabhi insisted that he had the indirect support of Nehru.¹⁰ Though Pattabhi had provided Congress leaders in the government with assurances that he could be trusted to cooperate in maintaining an amicable relationship between party and government,¹¹ Tandon's candidacy almost promised a challenge.

His views on foreign, economic, and social policy were completely at variance with those of Prime Minister Nehru and the Congress Government.

Pattabhi emerged victorious by a narrow margin.¹² The immediate crisis was avoided, conflicts in the party were temporarily halted, and Pattabhi's two years in office helped to reinforce the relationship between the Congress President and the Prime Minister which had been more than implicit in Kripalani's resignation.

Pattabhi, who recognized the limitations of the office of Congress President, was also temperamentally equipped to play a passive role as the day-to-day administrator of the party machine. In his Presidential Address at Jaipur, he acknowledged the fact that the

real "power" remained in the hands of the government, although the party could attempt to "influence" government decisions.¹³

But after two years as President, even Pattabhi was disillusioned by the impotence of the office. By this time he was characterizing the Congress Presidency as "a position of responsibility without authority, expectation without opportunity, and prestige without power."¹⁴

Thus, for a period of three years following the resignation of Kripalani in 1947, a spirit of harmony reigned between party and government. This is to say that the party ceased to be the centre of decision-making in India and the functions of the Congress President were confined strictly to party organizational affairs. Yet the issue of supremacy had not yet been laid to rest, for a group within the organization was determined to make one last attempt to reverse this process.

Phase Two

In 1950, as the end of Pattabhi's term drew near, the time was ripe for the attempt. Again there was a crisis in the country and turmoil in the party. Renewed communal friction produced a flood of refugees fleeing from East Pakistan to West Bengal, and the enormity of the migration brought into question the wisdom of Nehru's policy towards Pakistan and the viability of India as a secular state.

Since Patel had only reluctantly supported these aspects of Nehru's policy, such developments brought the Nehru-Patel relationship under renewed stress, and the resulting friction between the leaders was reflected in the party organization.¹⁵ At the same time, within the organization itself, long-submerged tensions and disagreements over governmental, foreign, domestic, and social policies, and on party-government relations rose again to the surface.

As in the Pattabhi-Tandon battle two years earlier, these dissensions within the party were reflected in an open contest for the Congress presidency. Although Pattabhi's role was now assumed by Acharya Kripalani, Tandon emerged once again as the candidate of the right wing of the Congress, and the election took on much of the character of the Jaipur contest.

But this time the results were reversed. Tandon, whose supporters had succeeded in capturing control of the party organization in the states during the two years since his previous defeat, had become strong enough to win control of the Congress presidency.¹⁶

The election of Tandon placed the right wing of the Congress in complete control of the party organization and its decision-making organs. Yet, at the height of its power, the group lost the support of its major patron: on December 15, 1950, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel died. With Patel's death, Nehru was forced to intervene more actively in party organizational affairs,¹⁷ and the scene was set for the second major clash between the Prime Minister and the Congress President in less than four years.

At first Nehru's intervention was conciliatory in nature. He attempted to prevent the defeated group led by Kripalani from leaving the Congress. At the same time, for almost a year, he laboured unceasingly to prevent the majority group in the Congress from squeezing out the minority.

But both efforts failed, Kripalani and a group of Gandhians left the Congress to found the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (K.M.P.P.). Threatened by further defections, faced with the resignation of two of his ministers, and confronted by a direct challenge to his leadership as Prime Minister,¹⁸ Nehru resigned from the Congress Working Committee.¹⁹

Shortly after his resignation, he challenged the authority of the Congress President directly by demanding the reconstitution of the Committee. Tandon, refusing, insisted that he alone, as Congress President, had authority to decide on the composition of his Working Committee. Moreover, Tandon argued, taking issue with various government policies, the Congress Government was responsible for following the pronouncement of the party organization. According to Tandon, no Prime Minister could ignore the dictates of the party.²⁰

Nehru, of course, did not agree. Equipping himself with an overwhelming vote of confidence from the Congress Party in Parliament,²¹ he decided to challenge Tandon openly before a special session of the A.I.C.C. But the confrontation never took place. When the Working Committee assembled on the eve of the A.I.C.C. meeting, the members of the Committee collectively submitted their resignation to Tandon.²²

The hope was that their action would facilitate the emergence of a compromise list of new Working Committee members acceptable to both Nehru and Tandon,²³ but Tandon refused to be forced into such a compromise.²⁴ Instead, he resigned as Congress President, admitting that he was really in no position to challenge the Prime Minister. "Pandit Nehru," he said in his resignation statement, "is not an ordinary member of the Working Committee.

He represents the nation more than any other individual today."²⁵

Phase Three

Tandon's resignation marked the end of the second great struggle between the Congress President and the Prime Minister. It confirmed the pre-eminent role of the Prime Minister and reinforced the boundaries of the office of Congress President, which had been revealed once more as limited strictly to organizational affairs.

Once again it was evident that no Congress President could succeed in an attempt to hold the government responsible to the extra-parliamentary mass organization of the party. Moreover, in confirmation of the supremacy of the parliamentary wing, the Nehru Government's programme of social and economic reform was accepted by the party as a guideline for united Congress action.

Nehru in Two Roles

For three years following the Tandon resignation, Nehru attempted to ensure party-government harmony by playing a double role as both Prime Minister and Congress President. Though Nehru provided the party organization with vigorous leadership in preparation for and during the First General Elections, his post-election activities were concentrated on organizing and energizing the new government.

As a result, Nehru had little time to devote to party organizational affairs. The day-to-day work of the Congress President was carried out by U. S. Malliah and Balvantrai Mehta, the two Congress General Secretaries, who consulted Nehru on major problems.

At first Nehru had considered his dual leadership role as a strictly temporary affair. However, when friction over the role of the party vis-a-vis the government persisted, Nehru reluctantly agreed to remain as Congress President for a second term.²⁶ The result of Nehru's three-year tenure as Congress President was to permit the mass organization to participate in the policy process by ratifying the major policy objectives of the government. The party was, however, subordinated to the needs of the parliamentary wing.

On the surface, Nehru's tenure as Congress President was less turbulent than the years immediately following independence had been, but the trend over which so much controversy had been

generated under Kripalani and Tandon continued. As a result, by the time Nehru stepped down from the post, a significant change in Congress attitudes had taken place.

There had been created, as Frank Moraes has observed, "a Congress habit of mind which has led the overwhelming bulk of the party to look to the Prime Minister and not to the President of the Congress for political guidance."²⁷

When, in the fall of 1954, Nehru relinquished the Congress presidency, the lessons he had learned during the Kripalani and Tandon crisis, his three years as Congress President, and his conception of the role of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the chief executive of the party conditioned the selection of Congress Presidents for the next decade. These ten years marked the third phase in the post-independence development of the role of the Congress President.

Nehru's Criteria for Congress President

In evaluating candidates for the office during this period, Nehru relied extensively on the recommendations of his chief advisers in the party, particularly Pandit G. B. Pant and Lal Bahadur Shastri. The acceptability of each candidate depended to a great extent on Nehru's assessment of the consensus in the party and on his reading of political conditions in the country. Political exigencies required that candidates be selected in light of such considerations as regional balance, minority representation, and the development of new young leaders.

However, the single most important criterion for selecting Congress Presidents during the third phase was previous government experience at the highest possible level. Since 1955, with the exception of Mrs. Gandhi, all Congress Presidents approved by Nehru have been former chief ministers; and, ever since the selection of U. N. Dhebar to succeed Nehru later in 1954, it has been argued in support of this criterion that men who have held important executive posts in the government are capable of a much clearer understanding of the circumscribed role required of the leader of the party organization.

The supremacy of the Prime Minister was never more evident than during the decade comprising the third phase. During this period each candidate for Congress President had to receive Nehru's personal endorsement and once in office the chief executive of the party lacked the status to challenge the Prime Minister's authority.

Phase Four

The selection of Kamaraj Nadar in 1964, however, represented a significant alteration in this pattern and perhaps the beginning of a fourth phase. Although Kamaraj, like the Congress Presidents who preceded him, had been approved by Nehru before being formally confirmed in the office, he differed from them in a very important way—he is undoubtedly the most imposing personality to occupy the Congress presidency since Rajendra Prasad.

A shrewd politician with a highly developed talent for organizational detail, Kamaraj is the unquestioned leader of the South and enjoys wide respect elsewhere in the party. Moreover, having come to the Congress presidency just before the transition caused by the end of the Nehru era, Kamaraj was in an opportune position to play a crucial role in effecting a smooth transfer of power to a new Prime Minister.

Because of his personal stature in the Congress and his position as Congress President, Kamaraj was called upon to carry out several important functions in the days following Nehru's death: he was given a grant of power from the Working Committee to determine the party consensus on Nehru's successor; he chaired the meeting of the Congress Party in Parliament at which a successor was elected; and it is clear that he was consulted in the process of Cabinet formation.²⁸

These are not functions inherent in the office of Congress President. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine the Congress Presidents of the previous decade providing such leadership and maintaining throughout the process, as Kamaraj did, the respect and confidence of the parliamentary wing.

The role played by Kamaraj in securing the unanimous election of Shastri has roused speculation concerning the crucial problem of the relationship between the Congress President and the Prime Minister, a problem which had all but disappeared in the course of the Nehru era.

With the passing of Nehru, many feared a return to the conflict which had marked the early years of the post-independence period of the Congress. It was also feared that there would be some attempt to subordinate the parliamentary wing of the party to the dictates of the mass organization. All indications, however, have clearly demonstrated that Kamaraj and Shastri have so far been able to establish a workable division of roles.

Though in the months following Nehru's death Kamaraj has

spoken out on several issues with a boldness and an air of autonomy uncharacteristic of most recent Congress Presidents, his behaviour is indicative not of revolt but of the new spirit of debate and criticism which has marked all organs of the Congress.

Kamaraj's statements on domestic issues such as planning and language policy and even his comments on foreign affairs have indicated considerable freedom of action. In his first Presidential Address at Durgapur, for instance, Kamaraj suggested a scaling down of the size of the Fourth Plan because "any inflationary pressures arising out of large investments would again have its severe impact on the poorer and weaker sections of society."²⁹

These remarks caused such a flurry of activity in government circles that a special meeting of the Planning Commission was called to reconsider the size of the Plan.³⁰ No immediate changes were made, but the debate continued. When the final size of the Plan was announced at approximately the figure first mentioned, it was well above the limit Kamaraj had suggested.³¹

Although this incident suggests the extent of Kamaraj's influence, it does not necessarily indicate conflict between the Prime Minister and the President of the Congress. As one observer close to Kamaraj has suggested, Shastri also had personally preferred a smaller plan, but had given way to demands from members of both wings of the party for the larger commitment which had been anticipated while Nehru was still alive.³²

It is also interesting to note that Kamaraj felt free, at the height of the national language controversy early in 1965, to make a statement indicating some annoyance with Central Government language policy.³³ Later, in the midst of the Rann of Cutch incident, he delivered a speech in Madras attacking the United States for its silence on the alleged use of American weapons by the Pakistani forces and praising the Soviet Union for its friendship with India.³⁴ It would be difficult to imagine the Congress Presidents of the Nehru era taking such strong positions publicly.

Kamaraj and Shastri

Yet, while recognizing that Kamaraj has exercised considerable autonomy, it is also important to take into account several other factors which influence his role. In the first place, it is interesting to note a certain parallel between Kamaraj and Rajendra Prasad, the two major personalities (with the exception of Nehru) to have held the office during the period under consideration.

Kamaraj, like Prasad before him, enjoys an independent political reputation and yet is temperamentally capable of playing a restrained role. Moreover, as a southerner, Kamaraj is unlikely to be in the position of pretender to the Prime Ministership. Rather he must be content to function in a role that allows him to influence but not determine government policy.

Secondly, Kamaraj has had almost ten years of ministerial experience as Chief Minister of Madras. He can thus understand the nature of ministerial responsibility and the complexities of policy formulation and implementation. In addition, as Chief Minister, he earned a reputation not only for maintaining high standards of administration but also for preserving harmony between the party organization and the government.³⁵

Until now he has been firmly committed to the principle of separation of party and government. Finally, once the new Prime Minister has had a chance to establish himself firmly in office, the levers of power at his command will place him in a very formidable position vis-a-vis the Congress President.

Recent events seem to confirm these observations. The manoeuvring over the contemplated re-election of Kamaraj demonstrates the close relationship which has developed between the Prime Minister and the Congress President. Shastri has insisted that Kamaraj must remain Congress President in order to ensure continued cooperation between party and government.

"Lal Bahadur Shastri," it has been reported, "told the Working Committee in unmistakable terms that he needed the continued cooperation of Mr. Kamaraj as Congress President." From this it was deduced that Shastri was "bluntly suggesting" that he could not "place the same confidence in others."³⁶ The strength of the Shastri-Kamaraj axis was demonstrated at the A.I.C.C. meeting held in July 1965 at Bangalore.

At this time Morarji Desai broke with Shastri, Kamaraj, and the majority of the Working Committee in an attempt to block a Working Committee resolution drawn up to give the Committee discretionary authority in applying the one-term ban on party office holding which dated back to a resolution adopted at the Hyderabad meeting of the A.I.C.C. in 1958.³⁷

Morarji argued before the Bangalore A.I.C.C. that the Working Committee was just looking for a way "to enable Mr. Kamaraj to have another term of office." Such an exception, he argued in protest, would be "a negation of democracy."³⁸ In the end, however, Morarji did not press for a vote in the A.I.C.C.

Behind his restraint was an informal tally of A.I.C.C. delegates indicating that the Shastri-Kamaraj coalition commanded a clear majority of 400 to Desai's 50.³⁹ Thus failed the first post-Nehru attempt to challenge the Prime Minister by gaining control of the Congress presidency. Kamaraj's re-election was assured.

There has also been more direct evidence that Shastri has strengthened his position by virtue of the leadership position which the Prime Minister enjoys. The occasion was provided by the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Shastri's decisive action was hailed by the press and by the masses. His new popularity has, in turn, fortified his position as Prime Minister.⁴⁰

PARALLEL EVOLUTION OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE

The shift in the locus of power which developed in the relationship between the Congress President and the Prime Minister was accompanied and facilitated by a parallel development in the relationship between the Working Committee and the Cabinet.

With the formation of the Interim Government in 1946, the decision-making monopoly enjoyed until then by the Working Committee came to an end. Thereafter, despite strong opposition from the organization, the party leaders in the government reshaped the Working Committee to suit the new circumstances in India. In the process two important decisions were made.

First, in order to insure party-government coordination, members of the Interim Government were permitted to retain membership on the Working Committee, a decision which eventually enabled the parliamentary leaders to dominate the Committee.

Second, the Congress leaders in the government established guidelines for limited Working Committee participation in decision-making. The result of two of these decisions was to subordinate the policy-formulating role of the Working Committee and the party organization to that of the parliamentary wing.

Dual Membership

The decision to permit members of the Interim Government to remain on the Working Committee, reached only after a bitter struggle within the party, still ranks high among the more significant organizational decisions in Congress history. The proposal was initiated in 1946 by Pandit G. B. Pant, Chief Minister of Uttar

Purshottamdas Tandon's presidency of the Congress.

Tandon's Working Committee was dominated largely by party bosses from the major states. Many were parochial in outlook and almost diametrically opposed to the social and economic policies of the Nehru Government. While Tandon considered his Working Committee truly representative of the Congress in the states, Nehru felt it was not. Moreover, Nehru was "convinced" that he himself did not fit into Tandon's Working Committee. He was "not in tune with it."⁴⁶

Thus, when Tandon and his Working Committee attempted to call the tune for the parliamentary wing, they were forced to resign under pressure from the Prime Minister, who then became Congress President. Under Nehru's leadership the composition of the Working Committee underwent a significant alteration. The resulting pattern of membership has continued substantially unchanged until today.

Ministers Dominate the Working Committee

After the First General Elections, at the Indore Session of the A.I.C.C., Nehru was given complete freedom to select his Working Committee. The one-third rule governing Working Committee membership was dropped.⁴⁷ As a result, the organizational element, which in Tandon's Working Committee had been represented by the P.C.C. Presidents, was replaced by a strong ministerial element drawing upon Central Cabinet ministers and the important chief ministers in the states.

In this way organizational dominance was replaced by ministerial dominance and the Working Committee became a means of co-ordinating All-India Congress policy at the non-official party level. From this point on, there was no significant divergence between party policy resolutions and governmental action.

In the midst of the struggle over the composition of the Working Committee, the Congress leaders in the government had already begun the process of reshaping the decision-making role of the party executive. In July 1947, on the eve of the formal transfer of power and after about eight months of experience as Prime Minister, Nehru drafted a top secret memorandum on party-government relations which was distributed to Congress President Kripalani, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalacharia, and Mahatma Gandhi.

In the memorandum Nehru outlined the new role which he

Pradesh and one of the most experienced parliamentarians in the Congress.

Pant warned that barring members of the Interim Government from the Working Committee would diminish its importance and create a serious tussle between the Congress party and the government.⁴¹ Though the principle of dual membership was opposed by some members of the Working Committee and attacked bitterly on the floor of the A.I.C.C., it was finally adopted by a vote of 135-80.⁴²

But the battle was not over. It had only shifted to a second front. The party's reluctant acceptance of Pant's resolution was demonstrated by continued efforts to limit the proportion of ministers to organizational members of the Working Committee. In fact, even during the A.I.C.C. debate, many delegates had insisted that no more than one-third of the Working Committee be ministers.

Though the restriction was defeated, Acharya Kripalani, the first post-independence Congress President, announced that he felt morally and personally obligated to limit the number of Interim Government members on his Working Committee to one-third of its membership.⁴³ Kripalani's action, however, was nullified by the rapid movement of events.

In the reconstitution of the Indian Cabinet following the transfer of power, more than half of Kripalani's Working Committee were given posts in the government,⁴⁴ a situation Kripalani found intolerable. There is little doubt that it played a role in his decision to resign from his position as Congress President.

Kripalani's resentment over government domination of the Working Committee was widely shared by the rank and file in the Congress. So widely shared was it that when, at the session of the A.I.C.C. at Bombay in 1948, the delegates succeeded in adopting a limitation of the ministerial membership on the Working Committee—one-third of the total membership—they embodied the restriction not merely in a resolution, but in an amendment to the new Congress Constitution.⁴⁵

Ironically, the restriction only served to weaken the Working Committee still further. By blocking the appointment of many important leaders from the parliamentary wing, it left the W.C. staff with men who enjoyed little real power in the Congress.

The one-third rule placed organizational leaders in a majority on the Working Committee for a brief and ineffectual period. It is not coincidental that the peak of organizational influence on the Working Committee was reached during the stormy term of

expected the party executive to play. The cabinet system, Nehru told his colleagues, imposes certain responsibilities on a Prime Minister. It also places restrictions on the role of the party executive. The Prime Minister, he noted, plays a special role in directing and coordinating the activities of the government and the government as a whole needs freedom to shape its policies. "Normally," emphasized Nehru, "a party executive lays down the broadest lines of policy and leaves it to the government to work it out."

Moreover, specific issues, especially those of a confidential nature treating such matters as financial, economic, and defence policies, could not even be discussed in the party executive. In short, the Nehru memorandum served notice that the Working Committee would have to confine its discussions to broad issues of general policy.⁴⁸

Nehru's Formula

Nehru's formula for party-government coordination met strong opposition within the mass organization. As a national movement which had grown up in opposition to government for more than a half century, the Congress could not easily adjust to a situation which would leave it subordinate to any government, even if that government were controlled by its own leaders and represented the supreme achievement of the goals for which it had striven.

In a sense, Kripalani symbolized these frustrations in his controversy with the Prime Minister. The A.I.C.C. delegates were giving formal utterance to such feelings when they amended the first post-independence party constitution to ensure that ministers could not obtain a controlling majority on the party executive committee.

As a result of the organization's determination not to be submerged, there were times, during the years of transition from 1946 to 1951, when party pronouncements and government policy differed materially. For example, the policies recommended in the party's "Economic Programme Committee Report" were completely at variance with the economic policies finally adopted by the government.

But when this was pointed out, the Prime Minister made it clear that he considered himself and his government responsible, not to the party and its pronouncements, but to the decisions of the legislative party and the Parliament. Therefore, he told Parliament, "the final authority" for any programme would be "this

house"—that is, Parliament.⁴⁹ The party might lay down general policy, but it was up to the legislative wing to decide on the timing, the priorities, and the pace in carrying out those policies.

Moreover, in cases where the Working Committee actually issued specific directives to the government, as in the case of the cow slaughter and *vanaspati* issues, the Cabinet refused to implement them on the grounds that they conflicted with the larger principles governing the national interest which the legislative wing of the party was bound to take into consideration under a parliamentary system of government.

Parliament vs. Party

Coordination between party and government did not become entirely smooth until after Nehru's triumph over Tandon in 1951. Following this, Nehru's pre-eminent position as Congress President and Prime Minister and the repeal of the one-third rule, which thereafter permitted the parliamentary wing to dominate the Working Committee, ensured the harmonious and effective coordination which the Nehru memorandum had called for.

Under this arrangement the Prime Minister kept the party executive informed of government decisions and used the Working Committee as a means of proclaiming the broad objectives of the government. The parliamentary party leaders so dominated the Working Committee, and through the Committee the mass organization, that the party organization had little opportunity to formulate a policy that was independent of government.

During the Nehru era the Working Committee became part of a wide circle of decision-making bodies which were consulted during the process of policy formulation. While the Committee may have been able to influence policy at some point in the policy process, influence is not tantamount to dominance, as one discovers by examining important decisions made during the years following the transfer of power in 1947.

The economic decisions embodied in the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 were both products of Cabinet not Working Committee decisions. The adoption of the concept of the socialist pattern of society was approved first by the Cabinet, and then by the National Development Council, the Congress Party in Parliament, and the Lok Sabha before its official endorsement by the Congress Working Committee, the A.I.C.C., and the Avadi Session of the Congress.

Moreover, government decisions on social policy such as the Hindu Code Bill were implemented despite strong opposition from the party organization. Even in the case of states reorganization, which endangered the unity of the country as well as the unity of the party, the final decisions were made by the parliamentary wing.

There is still another reason why the role of the Working Committee as a major policy-making body came to an end with the transfer of power: the Committee was simply not equipped to act as the major decision-making body for free India.

The Working Committee had almost no secretariat facilities, it met too infrequently, and its non-ministerial members did not have the expertise to handle the complex problems of independent India. If there had been the will to do so, these inadequacies might have been rectified in such a way as to permit the party organs to dominate. But such was not the case.

From the very beginning the Congress leaders of the government rejected the proposition that the party organization could act as an extra-parliamentary directorate for the government. Insisting on a free hand in making and carrying out policy, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet refused to bow to the dictates of the Congress President or his Working Committee. Therefore, when Congress Presidents have challenged the Prime Minister, they have been forced to resign.

As for the Working Committee, its status has been described as follows:

So long as the men who control the Central Government also dominate the party's executive there is no conflict between the two. But as soon as the Working Committee pulls in a direction different from the one in which the Government is inclined to go, a conflict between the two will become inevitable and the Working Committee will at best reduce itself to a pressure group. No Congress President can be oblivious to this danger and of the strict limits that exist to what he or she can do to change the character of the Working Committee.⁵⁰

A Viable Democratic System

As we have seen, this development was not accidental. It proceeded from a conscious effort on the part of Congress leaders to establish a viable democratic system. This system could not

flourish under a party dictatorship in which the extra-parliamentary organs of the Congress reigned supreme. Thus, having adopted the British model of parliamentary government, the Congress leaders adjusted the functioning of the party to that model.

In consequence of this adjustment, U. N. Dhebar, speaking from experience as a post-independence Congress President, reminded his organizational colleagues that

*in relation to the task before the Government, the special feature of our Constitution makes the Government responsible to the Legislatures which consist of partymen as well as non-partymen. Congressmen have to appreciate that this necessarily results in placing some limitations upon the Government.*⁵¹

To paraphrase Dhebar's words, because the government is not free to act independently of the Parliament, its responsiveness to its own mass organization is also limited.

The Nehru era is over and the Congress is passing through an important period of transition. During his seventeen years as Prime Minister of independent India, Nehru played a critical role in shaping the new government and establishing its relation with the mass organization of the Congress. His passing was bound to produce some changes.

It seems clear that the party organization under the leadership of Kamaraj has enjoyed a certain ascendancy in the period since Nehru's death. The result has been to restore some balance between party and government.

Yet while Kamaraj and the organs of the mass organization have criticized and questioned government policy more freely than before, so far at least, they have not demanded that the government be responsible directly to the extra-parliamentary organs of the party.

While prediction is always difficult in transitional situations, it seems highly probable that the functional separation between party and government will continue and that while the party may influence it will not dominate the policy-making process.

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SOUTH INDIA: AN ANCIENT CULTURE FACES CHANGE

ALBERT B. FRANKLIN

WHEN THE FIRST SO-CALLED ARYANS came to Peninsular India with their Brahmi script, their horses, their light skin, their castes, and their Vedic religion four centuries or more B.C., they found a relatively dark-skinned people with a highly developed village civilization, an active agriculture, merchant marine, well-developed internal and international trade routes, and a set of gods and goddesses (a pantheon) of their own which did not in all cases coincide with the Vedic pantheon, but which had areas of congruence.

The land and the people of Peninsular India accepted the Brahmins as their priestly caste, used the Brahmi script as a basis for developing syllabaries to suit the South India languages, modified and adapted folklore and religious lore, but throughout this process the South Indian genius for absorption, adaptation, and adoption conferred on each new cultural contribution accepted from the North a changed character, subtly endowing it with a South Indian cast.

What Is South India?

Briefly, South India is that area south of the Vindhya. This division seemed logical when a fairly low-lying mountain range and a river could be considered a barrier to expansion. In modern times, administrative divisions of the country along linguistic lines have reduced the meaning of the expression "South India" to the four states of Andhra, Mysore, Kerala, and Madras.

The area occupied by these four states is roughly a quarter of a million square miles, about the same as Texas, but the population, extrapolating at 2.5 per cent from the 1961 census, is just under 125,000,000 or 500 people per square mile on the average for the entire area.

The relation of the geography of the area to its problems of development is best understood by considering the line of the Vindhya Hills and the Nerbada River as a barrier around which the tides of invasion, modernization, and international contact must wash, only to lose their impact on the long sloping beach of village Peninsular India.

Land of Passage and Trade

While the successive invasions of Aryan, Persian, Greek, Hun, Mogul washed around the northern ramparts and were expended in sometimes elegant splashes of blood, glory, or beauty, the length of Peninsular India, the ports of South India were in a constant busy traffic. The coastline of South India is a problem for modern ships, but the Arab dhow and the country boat of Southeast Asia found the long extensions of sandy beach, and the silting river mouths more or less ideal for their business.

Their business was chiefly to load textiles, peacocks, ivory, spices in return for gold, wine, and, later, horses. Culturally a fruitless exchange perhaps, except that it fed the South Indians' love for gold, and therefore increased the use of gold in ceremony and dowry, while, on the other hand, it created a demand for fine textiles and spices in Europe which eventually would send great ships around the Cape of Africa and the Horn of the western sea.

So, throughout recorded history, until quite recent times, Peninsular India has viewed the oft-invaded, oft-conquered India north of the Vindhyas with sovereign unconcern. Indeed, for two millennia it was inconceivable to South Indians that any country could possess greater liberty, higher culture, more of any of the good things of life than they possessed.

This was confirmed by the very awe of the visiting sailors and merchants, the occasional Greek, Italian, or Chinese wanderer. Learning, music, the sparkle of jewels, silks, the dance, varieties of food, poetry—nothing of which the sovereigns or the people could have heard would have caused them to question that this, indeed, was the centre of the world, and their system of life and worship therefore the best.

At once the most astonishing and the most important aspect of South India to grasp is the extraordinary length of time during which a continuous, uninterrupted culture pattern bound the peoples south of the Vindhyas.

Our western and European time-spans are ridiculously brief in comparison. When Caesar conquered Britain, the Romans were already concerned about the flow of gold to Calicut, Quilon, and Kaveripatinam. As long ago as that, the story of ancient conflicts between South India and Lanka, or Ceylon, had been stylized into myth.

As long ago as that, highly sophisticated Brahmins from North India were at work finding ways to adapt the Brahmi script to express the intricate phonemic structure of the Dravidian tongue, which had already, through a millennial process, split into separate languages.

South Indian culture, as seen in the first available records, was already an ancient culture, and the impact of the Brahmins, who must have appeared around 400 B.C., was that of codifying, strengthening further with the written record, culture patterns that were already ancient. They did not bring change, except as the medium of the written language brings change.

Frustrating as the vagueness of Dravidian chronicles may be to the historian in his search for dates, watersheds, progress, names of great men, it has an advantage in permitting a focus on the continuous aspects of the South Indian patterns of culture.

Underneath the rich overlay of Hinduism, and setting aside (in a way of which Indians would not approve) the great philosophical figures of South Indian history, the religion of South India has been, and still is, a mixture of animism and pantheism.

The interplay of village religion with the rich mythology of classical Hinduism has produced an intricate folklore replete with legends and festivals controlling, stressing, adding interest and lustre to every act of village and community life. But in broad outline, the gods of South India during the two thousand years from 400 B.C. to 1600 A.D. are gods of war and of fertility.

War

War was almost continuous prior to the sudden historical gap of the first four centuries of the Christian era, and the copper plates and constantly increasing inscribed memorials show that it remained so for fourteen hundred years thereafter. But in South India, war

was not an interruption of the way of life, it was part of it. Wars were never total. An enemy of last year was this year's ally against a new and common enemy. Meanwhile, both allies had a sharp eye for a deal with the enemy which would give an advantage, or the allies themselves, in a lull, might turn on one another again.

Duplicity was one of the rules of the game, and to be the second in command meant, almost by definition, to be open to suggestions from the enemy. *Thus* new dynasties were formed—among other ways. It is a hardy historian who will master the infinite series of marches and countermarches, the rise and fall of dynasties, the hoards of gold and jewels changing hands through loot, pillage, and treaty of victory.

In the foreshortened view of history it is difficult *not* to forget that this dynasty or that, which ruled for two, three, or four centuries, in fact ruled longer than many a European dynasty, and that there were years of peace, years of harvest, years of uninterrupted celebration of the many festivals that bejewel the garland of the South Indian year.

The Civil Service

But war costs money, materials, and men, and the very first rock inscriptions in the Brahmi script foreshadow the fuller descriptions we have later of the able bureaucracy, the highly developed civil service that each successive monarch could count upon for tax collection and support of the army.

It may be said conservatively that South Indians, particularly the southernmost of them, those of Cholanad and Cheranad, now Madras State and Kerala State, have behind them two and a half millennia of civil service training.

When a Tamil secretary in a ministry in Delhi passes a ribbon-tied file from in-box to out-box, he is performing a ritual his ancestors have been performing since the time of the Buddha.

The production of soldiers for the army, however, is not a task that bureaucrats can perform unaided. This was a serious need, all the more so as disease, particularly smallpox and cholera, took incredibly heavy tolls year after year.

Fertility

The most ancient cult in Dravidian India is the cult of the Nagaraj, the Serpent. This was, and is, a fertility cult. It survives

as such to the present day. When the mother of the present Governor of a South India state gave birth to her son, she made a pilgrimage of gratitude to the temple of Rameswaram to give an ex-voto offering of a carved stone image of the serpent king.

The great temple of Rameswaram, sacred to Rama, an avatar of Vishnu, hoary with antiquity as it is, is still, in the folk memory of South India, merely a superstructure—sacred though it be—over the incredibly ancient shrine of the serpent king appropriately placed at the end of the serpent-like peninsular jutting into the Gulf of Mannar. This serpent, by the way, appears in the background of all of the world's greatest religions—but that is another story.

Erotic aspects of the Hindu religion proper, which are perhaps too well known, were added to the cult of fertility itself, and a general feature of South Indian religious festivals—an extension really of the sculpture which survives in stone-cut temples—was the pleasure in the body itself, in procession, in dance, in pose. Italian travellers, Marco Polo in the thirteenth century and Pietro della Valle in the fifteenth, comment with typically Italian prudery on the exposed breasts of women of all classes at festivals, and the fact that there was little difference between the garb of men and women—both favouring G-strings, except that the women wore more jewellery.

Temple dancers were highly educated, frequently startlingly beautiful young ladies, who offered a constant competition with the prosaically married housewife. They have been called temple prostitutes, but this is a misnomer, as they were highly respected, highly educated, and their offspring had an automatic status in society wholly unlike the offspring of a prostitute.

These women, devadasis, servants of God, plied their trade until the British Raj intervened around 1930, with the result that several ladies trained in the profession still live and decorate the highest social circles in South India. One is currently preoccupied with family planning.

To a westerner, an obvious connection exists also between Tantric practices and the need for fertility. This view would be, to use a word of our own, heretical.

Mariammon

In the struggle for survival of the race amidst war and disease, the Goddess also took on one of her most fearful forms, that of

Mariammon. Mariammon is a form of Kali the destroyer, but, in particular, the destroyer through smallpox. She is worshipped in fear, and her temple, in thousands of South Indian villages, stands under the health-giving, disease-preventing vepery, the neem tree. Annually her effigy is painted with red spots, paraded through the streets, and ceremonially tossed outside the village limits, or even into the limits of the next village where she will appease her hunger.

During her festival strong men disguise themselves as women with saris and rice powder, lipstick and false hair to confuse the Goddess, so that she may not know whether it be man or woman she attacks, and throughout village South India today, little boys are dressed as little girls so that the Goddess of disease will overlook them. The fantastic progress of the current vaccination campaign will surely affect these traditions in the near future. What will take their place?

The generous fecundity of South Indian women, coupled with the havoc, almost continual, of disease and war, made the Indian village resound to a continuing drum beat of ear-borings, christenings, funerals, marriages. Today's spectacular rise in life expectancy, coupled with hoped-for success in family planning, will leave a vacuum in community activity.

Community Divisions

The well-known four-storey caste system of the Vedas was never fully adopted in South India, where social and community divisions from ancient times followed the guild system later to be discovered in Europe.

Brahmins, however, found a ready place for themselves as advisers to the powerful and priests to the temples, and, because they first recorded history, they are ever present in the record.

There were guilds of every conceivable trade and skill, including the butcher's trade.

Vegetarianism, which is not prescribed either in the Vedas or anywhere else in canonical literature, appeared and spread in historic times, but for unrecorded reasons.

Merchants were a highly respected caste. The story of Poonidavadi, which must contain much that is based on custom if not on fact, has her wealthy merchant father marry her off to another wealthy merchant who, in the course of the story, which takes place in the sixth century A.D., sets sail on a business trip to the East.

Agriculturists and landowners are prominent in the first rock inscriptions attesting donations to holy men. Officers of the army, including generals, were chosen for reasons including aptitude, consanguinity, and training, but not for caste membership.

Belles-Lettres and Fine Arts

As a centre of community life the temple was a unique institution. The temples have always been the repository of great wealth, and indeed they still are. As such, they could maintain arts and crafts which could not flourish without rich patronage. Jewellery, ivory, stone- and wood-carving, and the ancient art of lost-wax bronze casting, painting, dancing, singing, and instrumental musicianship were all arts patronized by the temple and these arts are all, properly speaking, a part of the religious culture of South India. Poetry as well.

If some of the descriptive poetry of ancient South India is remarkably earthy and modern in flavour, if some of the stone sculpture and ivory artefacts seem utterly profane or prosaic, it is because nothing alive or useful to life was alien to the broad catholicity of the Hindu religion, or too complex or too everyday to escape the attention of the remarkable anonymous artists who laboured in and for the temples.

Speaking of customs and culture of a distant time, it is easy to slip into condescension. To speak of "primitives," of "ethnic" music, of "folk legends" and "folk art." Sculpture and music, however, speak a universal language, needing no translation, and the art of South India, from its most ancient times, speaks to the modern critic with an immediacy and a superb mastery of medium and of subject matter.

Wherever beyond the bounds of history lie the origins of Dravidian culture, its sophistication in art and symbol for two thousand years produced examples comparable with and at times superior to the noblest periods of Greece, Rome, Florence, Flanders, or Spain.

No survey of world art is really complete without the coy yakshi or devadasi of Mamallapuram, or for that matter without Mamallapuram's monkey mother and child, or deer scratching its muzzle. No bronze of Europe or the East captures the subtlety of facial expression of the Karaikkalammeiyar of Thiruvallangadu or the turbaned Siva of Tanjore.

The niche sculptures of the Ramappa Temple, in the wilderness

forty miles northeast of Warangal, in Andhra Pradesh, anticipate the Belgian Lehmbruck by seven hundred years.

In Trivandrum, the museum has a fourteenth-century bronze goddess whose modernity seems to embrace western art from the Renaissance to our time, to convey to us a smile of comprehension, the approving glance of a loving parent, for all we have been up to in art since Michelangelo. The superb art of the Somnathpur, Halebid, and Belur temples challenges the critic to select a single work.

Hospitality to Foreigners

Wars were part of the way of life, but so was hospitality to foreigners, including hospitality to alien religion. The Jews of Cochin, the Nestorian Christians in Malabar and San Thome, even the Muslims, who brought holy war against the Hindus, found a place within South Indian society. Krishnadevaraya, whose reign marked the peak of the Vijayanagar Empire, the last and greatest of the Hindu empires of the South, had at his court and his harem Hindus, Muslims, Christians, orientals, Europeans, Arabs, and had, of course, frequent contact with the Portuguese in Goa.

Villagers shared this trait of hospitality, so far as it concerned foreigners and strangers, despite the sharp boundaries among communities within the village itself. With what amazement we view the stone sculpture of a Levantine or European merchant on the side of the great vimanam or steeple of the eleventh-century temple at Tanjore!

This hospitality has been a lasting defence against the imposition of other customs, other religions. A welcomed alien finding gentle obedience and kindness on all sides does not need to impose his rule in matters of individual, community, caste, or village concern.

Four Nations

Doing some violence to the distinctive features of the four major divisions of Peninsular India, I have sketched the factors that cause the people of this area, now as then, to think and speak of themselves as South Indians, as Malayalis, Kannadas, Andhras, and Tamils, rather than as Indians.

The time-span of the culture I have been describing in terms of European history is roughly from the First Punic War to the present time. The monuments at Mamallapuram were mostly

already as they are today before the Moorish invasion of Spain. The temple at Tanjore corresponds to the period of the First Crusade, or, better, the Battle of Hastings.

Krishnadevaraya, whose living presence is still felt at hand by the peasants of Tungabhadra, began his reign fifty-five years before Shakespeare was born. Before the Battle of Hastings there were kings with the family name Varma ruling in Kerala whose surviving descendants sit on ceremonial thrones to this day in Trivandrum and in Kollengode. Long before Columbus discovered America, a powerful clan of agriculturists and landowners, the *Reddys* were a power to be reckoned with south and east of Warangal.

One other important factor sets the South Indian apart—the length of his association with the British. Shakespeare was a vigorous, middle-aged man of forty-five when the British gained their first foothold on the South Indian coast at Masulipatnam. Fort St. George in Madras was abuilding when the *Mayflower* sailed for America. A century and a half later, when the Americans defeated the British at Yorktown, General Cornwallis was rusticated to Madras as Governor.

But time—length of association—was not all. The long symbiosis of British and South Indians was of crucial importance in shaping the attitudes of South Indians today—its influence is at once more pervasive and more subtle than the influence of the British on any other subject people, including those of the rest of India.

The British arrived, in the early seventeenth century, not as invaders, but as one more in the long list of trading countries with posts established on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. Dutch, Portuguese, French, Arab, Roman had preceded them. Subtly they assumed another historically familiar role, that of the alien power that would take one side or the other in disputes, wars if you like, between rajas, maharajas, or against the ever active Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan.

Trade and the Raj

Again, only a slight change, a familiar change, repeated infinite times over two thousand years, and this trader, with his military power, began to assume the administration, the raj, as other powers had done so often in the past.

The administration remained much the same, the name of the raj alone changed and—who knows—would change again. The

very insularity of the British, seen by the South Indians as a natural extension of caste and community barriers which were part of the South Indian culture pattern for a thousand years, was itself possibly the strongest recommendation of this new raj.

Fully to comprehend the mutual acceptance of colonial power and subject power, it is also essential to remember that the British domination of South India took place well before the industrial revolution and that the representatives of Great Britain, in the days of the East India Company, brought with them concepts of exploitation which were not essentially different from those of all the various rulers who had taken their turn in the area.

If the British were more efficient, it was only because of the scrupulous adherence to rules of administrators which corresponded with amazing exactitude to those already in practice.

And in the case of local rulers whose wealth or local power seemed to entitle them to keep a degree of sovereignty, as in Travancore, Mysore, or Hyderabad, all of them were accustomed, at one time or another in their histories, to alliances which entailed a more or less humiliating degree of tribute masked by ceremony and the rituals of sovereignty. In addition, the South Indians (Tamils and Malayalis especially) displayed an extraordinary linguistic ability.

South India Changes Rulers—1947

Paradoxically, it was the English language itself that brought revolt to South India, that finally lined the South up behind the Quit India movement and Independence. Had it not been for the link of the English language, the historical events in North India which marked a crisis in British power would have been unknown, and if known, meaningless to a peaceful South India, still largely unchanged as the twentieth century began.

But the English language press was strong in South India, led by *The Hindu* of Madras. The press was largely an English language affair, and it must have seemed to some British secretaries that to suppress articles critical of the British, or indeed to suppress the English language press in its entirety, should not be too difficult.

In the event, however, it was the British attitude towards the Indian press which awoke South India finally to the essentially foreign nature of this raj. But this was a sad awakening. Even at its worst, the association had possessed overtones of mutual understanding and a more than superficial mutual involvement.

The parting was a sad one. The British lost an outpost in which generations of administrators and traders had been able to taste the lordly life, the stately home. Perhaps the loss to the South Indian villager was even greater. Accustomed as he was to a succession of overlords extending back to prehistory, his folk memory could evoke none so benevolent as the British, none whose ways so harmonized with the age-old village, community, and caste pattern.

There was no village which did not have memories of visits of British ladies with wide hats and parasols, of British collectors with clipped speech and jaunty manner, or with high-arched scholarly nose and Oxford accent.

(The class distinctions of the British speech patterns were entirely comprehensible to all Dravidian speakers, and were interpreted as status symbols of British castes as indeed they are. The Brahmins, after all, have a distinct mode of speech in each of the South Indian tongues.)

The question arose: What will the next raj be? The British left in South India a vacuum for the Government of India to fill. It was not a vacuum of bodies, or a vacuum of administrative procedures. It was a vacuum of governmental integrity, of a sentiment of being governed, of having a government which, for better or worse, knew what it was doing. A vacuum of respect. Would the Government of Independent India fill this vacuum?

Muslims in the South

Muslim-Hindu relationships in South India are quite different from what they are in the North. In the first place, trade with Arab Middle East has a continuous life, centring at Calicut and Cannanore and Quilon reaching back before the dawn of written history. The Arabic word Ma'abar means Ferry, or Passage.

The entire coast of Peninsular India with its sandy beaches and its silted river mouths hospitable to the rounded wooden bottoms of Arab dhows as well as canoes, catamarans, and the sewn timbers of country boats—the entire coast of Peninsular India from Quilon on the West around to Nellore on the East was known as the Ma'abar Coast—corrupted today as "Malabar Coast."

Two monsoons sweep India, one southwesterly, the other northeasterly. Thus, the southwest monsoon favoured passage from the Middle East to what is now Kerala, and from the Madras coast eastward to Pegu and Mergui, while the northeast monsoon

favoured the return voyage.

The Muslim stronghold at Calicut and Cannanore was the result of the demand for horses, and grew up between the eleventh and the fourteenth century. Horses for the Bahamani and Vijayanagar kingdoms, and later for the Portuguese, had to be imported from Arabia. Horse breeding in South India never was successful. It was in the interests of all these kingdoms to allow Muslim Malabar a degree of immunity.

The wave of Arab conquest over North India broke at the Tungabhadra River in the long rivalry of the Bahamani and Vijayanagar kingdoms. Over three hundred years, Muslims and Hindus became used to one another. The only deep penetration of South India by Muslim force prior to modern times was the Muslim Sultanate of Madurai which, though it lasted for some time, was not violent in treatment of Hindus.

Hindu South India absorbed the Muslims in the traditional manner, accepting them as yet another caste. After all, Hindu castes did not break bread together, yet cooperated in the total community. Muslims adopted certain trades and skills, conforming still more fully with the general pattern of guild division.

Perhaps because of this long coexistence, Hindus and Muslims in South India reacted comparatively slightly to the Hindu-Muslim confrontation in North India in 1948. Throughout South India, mosques and Hindu temples and frequently Christian churches stand in close proximity, with seldom if ever an outbreak of hostility based on religion.

The ancient temples for which South India is famous were scarred but not destroyed by the final wave of Arab invasion, and the Sultan of Madurai left the great Meenakshi Temple intact, while Tipu Sultan, though he built a huge mosque at Seringapatnam, his last stronghold, left intact the temples there.

A sidelight, almost a footnote, to this subject is that perhaps the most rabid destroyer of Hindu temples was none other than Saint Francis Xavier himself, who preached and made numerous converts all along the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, but particularly on the coast of what is now Madras State, between Tuticorin and San Thome.

Four States

South India came to Independence with one large, strong, and experienced administrative unit, called the Madras Presidency,

which included all of present-day Madras State, northern Kerala, and large portions of southern Mysore State and south central and coastal Andhra Pradesh.

The creation of present-day states, between 1954 and 1956, along largely linguistic lines, divided South India into Tamilnad, or Madras State, Malnad or Kerala, and the two states of Mysore and Andhra, in each of which a former princely state is surrounded by areas formerly belonging to Madras or Bombay Presidency.

Three of these four states, Mysore, Andhra, and Madras, have in varying degrees conformed to the institutional setup described in the Indian Constitution and the political pattern sought by the Congress Party—till now the Administration Party in India. The fourth, Kerala, is a special case.

In Andhra, Mysore, and Madras, a Governor parallels the ceremonial role of the King in England, and the President in the Central Government. Except where a particularly strong personality, such as Governor Giri, or a hereditary monarch, such as his predecessor, holds the governorship, that post is purely ceremonial and decorative. Under him, the government follows the British parliamentary system.

But whatever the formal setup, a one, two, three, four description of these four states conceals more than it reveals. Even modern South India is best described with reference to history and to culture rather than with reference to the new state framework.

Civil Administration

Radiating out from Madras, the first British stronghold in India, in every direction as the distance from Madras increases the familiarity with the English language decreases, and so does the thorough familiarity and adeptness at British civil administration.

In ruling India, the British found two admirable instruments to hand: the North Indian Muslims, for security, and the Tamils of Madras Presidency for clerical duties, for civil administrators. It should therefore not be so much a matter of pride for the people of Madras State that their state is one of the best administered in India. Instead, if it is not the best administered (as it well may be) that should be a matter for concern.

It is proverbial that no ministry, secretariat, newspaper, or business in Delhi can function without its corps of Tamil clerks. Only reasonable therefore that Tamilnad, Madras State, the source of this wealth of administrative know-how, should itself be well

run, and should itself be the most amenable to modern governmental institutions.

Andhra and the Reddys

The heritage of Andhra is somewhat different. Modern Andhra Pradesh is a fusion of two cultures: Urdu-speaking Hyderabad, once the wealthiest and proudest princely state of India, on the one hand, and, on the other, a Telugu-speaking majority which even in the most glorious days of the Nizamate constituted the mass of population both of Hyderabad itself and of Telengana and the rest of the huge area of Andhra State.

Two historic actions of drastically surgical nature were necessary (aside from the imposition of state boundaries) to create modern Andhra. One was the "police action" of 1948, which forestalled the possibility that the predominantly Muslim, Urdu-speaking Nizamate would opt for affiliation with Pakistan, and the other was the suppression of the Communist uprising in Telengana in 1954.

Andhra has a character all its own. Removal of the ubiquitous Tamil administrators, and the assumption of political control of both a princely state and a broad and unruly countryside have necessitated dependence on the Reddy community, always a force to be reckoned with across the waist of India, now a stabilizing influence in Andhra administration and politics except when competition among members of the clan occurs.

Mysore and Kerala

The Lingayat community performs a similar function in Mysore State, though Mysore still displays the mild characteristics of a country long accustomed to the benevolent rule of a series of enlightened rulers. This may be in part because the last of the Mysore Maharajas was permitted to remain in Mysore as Governor until very recently and even now maintains his household here.

When the division of India into linguistic states was accomplished in 1956, Kerala became a state. Until that moment, Kerala had been well on the margin of events in modern India. The princely state of Travancore-Cochin had continued under the raj of Independent India, as it had under the British, to enjoy autonomy of a sort, under an enlightened monarch and a creative dewan.

Under the shadow of monarchy, Tranvancore-Cochin was, in fact, ruled by the leaders of the castes and communities who formed the population. Thus, when statehood came, in 1956, Kerala was ill-prepared for a new form of government which gave no scope, either in its formal power structure or informally, to the traditional community leaders.

The upshot of the political infighting that grew out of this situation was that only one party seemed able to cross caste and community lines and establish itself as an all-community party in Kerala, namely, the Communist Party.

Yet up to the present, in the parliamentary system of government which is constitutional in India, the Communist Party has only briefly been able to form a government. The result is that with two brief intervals, one while a Communist government held power for nearly two years, and one during a short-lived Congress government, Kerala has been under what is known in India as President's Rule, namely, intervention by the Central Government.

Some believe that this state of affairs could have been forestalled by leaving the Muslim-dominated portion of Malabar in Madras State, and incorporating the conservative Malayali-speaking villages to the south and east of Trivandrum. Certainly this would have been no violation of the linguistic principle—if there is a principle involved.

Rice

It is often said that Andhra and Madras are self-sufficient in food or nearly so, Mysore less nearly self-sufficient, and Kerala woefully deficient. With due allowance for more correct figures which may be available in Delhi, these statements are usually, if not entirely, based on the production of rice.

Because of a common linguistic or idiomatic usage, in all the Dravidian languages, the word "food," used among native speakers, means literally "rice." Astounded only the other day at the number of dishes I had been served, when the bearer came in with another serving dish, I asked, "And what have you there?" "Food," he answered. It was rice. Nothing else is "food."

In fact, solution of the food supply problem in South India involves not only agricultural production, transport, storage, but, what is much more difficult, the changing of food habits. Like Kerala politics, this is a long story in itself.

Starting with an attitude of mind which considers that no meal

is a meal at all unless it is mainly rice, the problem is aggravated by insistence on particular kinds of rice.

Lastly, South Indians are divided into boiled rice eaters and raw rice eaters, and a raw rice eater will literally starve before accepting his ration in boiled rice, while a boiled rice eater is not satisfied by cooked raw rice. In this context, "boiled" means parboiled and husked, while "raw" means polished without par-boiling. Gods and Brahmins accept only raw rice, and raw rice alone is good for marriages, funerals, and other festival and ritual uses.

Cash Crops

All South Indians, except certain city dwellers, are, or intend to be, subsistence farmers. And the subsistence farming mentality is basic to the problem of adjustment to modernization. Despite this yearning of each family head to produce the food for his own family, Kerala is predominantly a producer of cash crops, many of which produce a high yield in foreign exchange.

The principal reason for Kerala's being allowed to remain a princely state under the British raj was simply that this was the easiest way to skim the cream off the rich trade in spices, tea, coffee, ivory, and the other sources of the fabled wealth of Ophir.

Brain Drain

Despite this wealth, the principal export of both Kerala and Madras over the last century or two has been brains. Tamils and Malayalis occupy an outsize proportion of clerical, secretarial, official, administrative, and executive positions in the Central Government, starting with the President of India himself and the President of A.I.C.C. The ranking civil servant in each of the four South Indian states is from the old Madras Presidency.

But the export of brains from South India is not confined to the states of India. Large numbers of Indian graduate students are in American universities and there are many Indian doctors in American hospitals and institutions. Unhappily for Indian development, many desire to remain overseas. Over 500 South Indians in the U.S. have changed their status from visitors to permanent residents or immigrants in the last eleven months alone. Overwhelmingly also, in terms of percentage of the whole, they are Tamils and Malayalis.

It is interesting, but not fruitful, to speculate on the reasons for this phenomenon. Language, culture, heredity, history all play their part. But for a short answer it is reasonable to state that (with the exception of Bengal) Madras Presidency and its neighbours the princely states of Travancore-Cochin and Mysore made more rapid advances in education.

Madras was, after all, the first Indian university, and the great numbers of Anglo-Indians in Madras caused the British Government and private benefactors to provide generously for their elementary and secondary education. Perhaps more decisive still was the large percentage of Christians in Travancore-Cochin and Madras Presidency.

The Indian Christian community in South India has for two centuries been devoted to the building and running of educational institutions. A surprisingly large majority of the Tamils in eminent positions in government and business and the professions are old boys of the Madras Christian College and Loyola College. And many of them got their start in schools provided by the enlightened rulers of Travancore-Cochin and Mysore.

The current educational crisis in South India is in part a function of the population explosion. How can seats, classrooms, teachers, books be supplied fast enough to keep up with the demand? Until this question is answered, the quality of education will deteriorate, as it has been perceptibly doing since Independence, and perhaps even before Independence.

This is a vicious circle. The high quality of education in South India produces a superior product. But this superior product, the well-known Tamil and Malayali brain, seeks a market elsewhere rather than in the underpaid and overloaded teaching profession in South India, and educational standards, though still high, suffer.

Educational superiority, coupled with superiority in the link language, English, has meant that the successful graduate of South India has always been able to find a job in the secretariat, either of a state or of the Central Government. Thus the sudden and quite unexpected (in South India) demand for elimination of English in government documents and the use of Hindi as the link language among Indian states has awakened a far more vehement reaction in South India than elsewhere.

If there is any constellation of problems in South India which rivals food production and population control in importance, it is the dual problem of education and the deterioration of educational

standards, hand in hand with the elimination of English as a medium of instruction.

The Challenge

The antiquated system of university-controlled syllabi and examinations (which reduces the college teacher to an automaton and destroys the possibility of any productive relationship between the teacher and the student) must, of course, be replaced by an approach to high school, college, and university education which will meet the needs of today.

An American commentator recently spoke of the cycle of "revolution, hope, frustration, and fury" as prevailing in many parts of the world today. South India does not fit this pattern. In this brief sketch, it is clear that South India has not had, within human memory, any revolution at all.

South Indians have seen some shifts in the old kaleidoscope of power similar in every way to those they have watched for two and a half thousand years. In South India's greatest periods, the Chola, the Pandya, the Pallava, the Vijayanagar, there was an identity between people and ruling class. In other periods, such as the present, there was not, except the doubtful identity of the clerical employee with his employer.

Revolution, hope, frustration, fury. If the youth of South India are entering this cycle, at any stage it is in that of frustration. The brains and the talent are there to turn this frustration not into fury, but into a creative, constructive revolution, a fulfilment of the hopes of Asia.

The overthrow of Congress in Madras State by a single, non-communal party, coupled with the emergence of an anti-communal (though Communist-led) political pattern in Kerala, the birth of an opposition bloc in Mysore, and the victory of the youthful Congress leaders in Andhra, taken together, may well be the beginning of such a constructive development for South India.

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JOHNSON AND THE AGE OF REFORM

JAMES RESTON

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, it is said, has read the election returns. He is more subdued. He is said to be more conservative. He has come back from his illness, his election defeat, and a winter of venomous criticism a chastened man, calling for the tax increase he rejected in 1966, and extolling conservatism.

This at least is the popular illusion. It is based on the tone and substance of his State of the Union speech. But if speeches can be accepted as a guide to future policies in Washington, which would be hard to prove, the theory of a transformed Johnson, of retreat to conservatism, is probably nonsense.

President Johnson is not shifting directions, he is merely shifting gears. He is not going from high to low, but from high to neutral momentarily. The direction is the same; the momentum is a little slower; but he is still exceeding the Republican speed limit.

The Mysterious Johnson

It is hard to be dogmatic about this. Lyndon Johnson is not a standard brand. He is as populist as Bryan; as progressive as the two Roosevelts; in some ways as conservative as the Tafts; as

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ambiguous as Eisenhower; as isolationist and imperialist as Senator Russell of Georgia; and as idealistic as Wilson at Versailles and as savage as his grandfather at the Alamo.

Nobody can be sure in the face of all this human diversity where he will come out, not even his best friends, half of whom are as conservative as the oil depletion Texans, and half of whom are low tariff, civil rights, foreign aid, birth control liberals. Yet when all these contradictory forces are recognized and analysed, the main thrust of his policy is fairly clear.

He Is No Consolidator

He is not a consolidator but an innovator. He may waver back and forth between the two, but essentially he is part of what Richard Hofstadter calls the "Age of Reform": Populist, progressive, a changer rather than a consolidator. He moves by fits and starts; he advances and retreats; but in general he moves with the tides of power.

This is perfectly clear in his State of the Union message. He rejected the policies of the extremes: of those who wanted to abandon South Vietnam or devastate North Vietnam. He went out of his way to appeal to the power and influence of the Soviet Union. He had very little to say to the allies in Europe, who have limited power. He was even generous to Communist China, now riven with dissension, maybe on the verge of warlordism or even civil war, and therefore vulnerable to attack.

On the home front, President Johnson compromised. Faced with conflicting evidence on whether inflation or deflation was the main threat in the economy, he suggested a delayed tax rise, he cut back the projected place of the poverty programme, insisted on his strategy and diplomacy in Vietnam, but temporized on everything else.

Reform and Experiment

Yet even while compromising and temporizing—and this is the main point—President Johnson is moving and reforming and experimenting. He is sticking to the old pattern on Vietnam, but innovating on everything else. He is not proving that the advantages of bombing North Vietnam are greater than the disadvantages. He is not demonstrating that his policy in Vietnam is helping American interests there more than it is hurting American interests

elsewhere in the world. He is not getting the South Vietnamese to take more responsibility in the war, but is making the whole thing more and more of an American war.

Nevertheless, Vietnam aside, the President is engaged in a number of remarkable experiments. He is trying to create a wholly new cooperative relationship in economic and political and cultural affairs with the Soviet Union and its Communist allies in Eastern Europe.

He is reaching out to the Governors and Mayors of America for a new political, social, and economic partnership within the nation. He is trying to take poverty out of the people rather than following the old New Deal technique of merely taking the people out of poverty by giving them handouts. He is not offering a dole to the poor as in Roosevelt's time, but an opportunity through education for the poor to save themselves.

A Radical Programme

This is not a conservative but a radical programme. He is not trying to follow but to transform the New Deal. He is not proposing to console the poor in their poverty but to give them the means of lifting themselves out of poverty. He is not using Federal funds to keep them where they are or to impose Federal control over the states and cities, but to finance the passage of the poor into useful, effective jobs, and create new partnerships between Washington and the state capitals and the cities and the other political centres in the world.

This, obviously, is a monumental task. In many ways it is an administrative mess but it is a creative and even hopeful mess. The President may not be able to see it through. Vietnam, with its \$20-billion a year budget, may destroy his aims of reaching an accommodation with the American cities and the Russians and the Chinese, but it cannot be said that he has gone conservative.

Johnson Remains a Reformer

He may be more subdued, as most observers said after his State of the Union performance. He may have made a tactical move to the right. But he is still moving and reforming. The liberals, who cry for innovation and reform, have been somewhat unfair to him in recent days: his overall strategy is not conservative but progressive.

He was under strong pressure to spend \$40 billion on a cold war antiballistic missile system; to take advantage of China's political disarray; to mount an even more aggressive economic warfare policy against the Soviet Union and Communist East European states; to keep tariffs high or even raise them higher; to approve more wiretapping and bugging and interference with personal liberty; to cut foreign aid and abandon government population control policies.

But he rejected all these proposals. If the State of the Union message means what it says, he is still a reforming President. He is in trouble with the reformers over Vietnam, but this wartime controversy only confuses the main point. Elsewhere, he is a changer, a populist, a progressive, a symbol of the innovator's spirit of Bryan, Teddy Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.

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FIVE POEMS

WILLIAM JAY SMITH

Northern Lights

I

I stepped out here on the mountainside, and saw the
northern lights, cold-clear, clear-white, blue-green, long
quivering gold knives of light shooting up, cutting the
sky the horizon round.

Up from the valley mist rose in waves, shot up in steady puffs,
clear-cold in the light,

And in places all the sky seemed made of moving skeins of white
hair rising water-clear, stars tangled in the flowing strands.

The brook ran below (it was August, but cold); and I could hear
its chill, pebbled water bubbling down, close in upon my ear.

Crickety night sounds: black trees came spangled forth, while
behind a moving green gold turned them into shaggy hulks
heaving in waves of light.

Trees stood, but moved, bearded and blowing, but no wind blew,
and the dark itself moved, kept moving with light.

II

Mist, held deep in the valley in layers chalk-white, sheet-white,

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FIVE POEMS

hung billowing between rock walls;

And still it rose, shade becoming light, light, shade, and as I
stepped into the field, grass also moved, brightened by all
these waves of hairy light.

The mountain pool caught, and tried to hold, patches of moving
light, and the water, coming down from the mountain, rang,
swinging clear

Over evergreens overgrown; ribbons of willow, beside or behind
or above the pool, leaned, moved, kept clear-turning until
the whole sky moved; and I stepped into an ever-deepening
river of grass, green-moving and slow, glowworm-light
expanding and wavering.

Thin blades of green cut through blue-green, or green upon white,
white upon gray, green upon mist-yellow, green and
primrose-yellow.

And primroses beside the rockpool, chill yellow in the moving
mist; and light kept coming by while I moved with light
moving, stood (leapt), reached (held) earth-air (whole-part),
clear-cold and all-white.

III

I stepped forth, calm but much shaken: no night there ever had
been so mist-torn, mountain-white.

The Milky Way had broken loose, and spun, a real web, round and
round until the milk strands tore loose, and hung dangling
above the valley.

A black dog lay by the road's edge, by a branch from a tree
fallen, unmoving, shaggy with mist;

The dark barn jutted forth, its peak a prow, against the buffalo-
humped mountains, and

In all innocence this night broke clear, sailing, sails trimmed
and taut, no longer beclouded and cloud-tossed, but coming
through, all clear.

IV

An August night: Jupiter off there in blowing, blissful mist-light.

It was cold; and sheer puffs, seemingly unpropelled, kept
coming up and out until the whole sky was moving, nacreous
and white—

All over mother-of-pearl, but pearl yet unformed, not white, but
blue-rippling pearl-shell, caught up and streaming, moss-green,
salmon-pink, and shaken.

Drunken, shivering, cold-quaking, I stood, moving skyward, still
drinking deep draughts shimmering and milk-white.

V

The sky was a moving bowl, hairy and white, with the stars chiselled
and chipped, spinning in the whole sky.

And the sky was rinsed clear, while the brook rushed on below,
cleaving night sounds.

And the whole night moved, an upturned bowl, as if the soul itself
had been washed clear

Of all entanglements, and shone forth, fresh-clean, overturned and
opalescent.

It was as if the soul alone could speak, and having spoken, rippled,
rubbed, and crossed, had been drained of speech

And shone forth new-clean, clear-cold, and white, with nothing now
within to hold or hide . . .

And I brushed the blowing skeins of light from my face, stepped
back and shut the door, and went inside.

FIVE POEMS

Dachshunds

"The deer and the dachshund are one."

—WALLACE STEVENS, *"Loneliness in Jersey City"*

The Dachshund leads a quiet life
Not far above the ground;
He takes an elongated wife,
They travel all around.

They leave the lighted metropole;
Nor turn to look behind
Upon the headlands of the soul,
The tundras of the mind.

They climb together through the dusk
To ask the Lost-and-Found
For information on the stars
Not far above the ground.

The Dachshunds seem to journey on:
And following them, I
Take up my monocle, the Moon,
And gaze into the sky.

Pursuing them with comic art
Beyond a cosmic goal,
I see the whole within the part,
The part within the whole;

See planets wheeling overhead,
Mysterious and slow,
While Morning buckles on his red,
And on the Dachshunds go.

The Antimacassar And the Ottoman

"I am leaving this house as soon as I can,"
Said the Antimacassar to the Ottoman.
"I hate this room, I loathe this chair,
I can't stand people's oily hair,
I long for a breath of mountain air.
I will fly away to Turkistan;
Will you come with me, dear Ottoman?"

The Ottoman sighed and said: "Oh, man!
I will certainly go with you if I can.
I, too, am sick of this overstuffed chair
And want nothing more than a breath of air!
I'm weary of having my praises sung
By an ugly pot of Mother-in-law's tongue!
Give me a mountain's twisted shapes
For the arsenic green of those green drapes;
Give me the green of a foreign land
For the green of that green umbrella stand!
I daily see a dreadful menace
In that awful painted scene of Venice
That glows at night like dead desire
Above an artificial fire.
I know by heart the sad tweet-tweets
Of those pale sky-blue parakeets!
And all I can hear is a high-pitched snicker
From that chaise longue of painted wicker!
The African violets are wet,
They haven't dried their pink eyes yet;
Day after day their hot tears come
Across the cold linoleum!
They *loathe* this room as much as I!
Tears, idle tears! I cannot cry.
Do let us go—do let us fly!"

FIVE POEMS

But an Ottoman it cannot fly,
And an Antimacassar—who knows why?—
Is pinned in permanence to a chair.
So when morning came, they both were there;
And no window opened to let in the air,
And neither had flown to Turkistan—
The Antimacassar nor the Ottoman.

Bay-breasted Barge Bird

The bay-breasted barge bird delights in depressions
And simply flourishes during slumps;
It winters on hummocks near used-car lots
And summers near municipal dumps.

It nests on the coils of old bed springs,
And lines its nest with the labels from cans;
It feeds its young on rusty red things,
And bits of pots and pans.

The bay-breasted barge bird joyfully passes
Where bulldozers doze and wreckers rumble,
Gazing bug-eyed, when traffic masses,
At buildings that feather and crumble.

It wheels and dips to the glare and thunder
Of blasted rock and burning fuel
While the red-hot riveted sun goes under
On every urban renewal.

It flaps long wings the colour of soot,
It cranes a neck dotted with purple bumps;
And lets out a screech like a car in a crack-up
As it slowly circles the dumps.

Pidgin Pinch

Joe, you Big Shot! You Big Man!
You Government Issue! You Marshall Plan!

Joe, you got plenty Spearmint Gum?
I change you Money, you gimme Some!

Joe, you want Shoe-Shine, Cheap Souvenir?
My Sister overhaul you Landing Gear?

Joe, you Queer Kid? Fix-you Me?
Dig-Dig? Buzz-Buzz? Reefer? Tea?

Joe, I find you Belly Dance,
Trip Around the World—Fifty Cents!

Joe, you got Cigarette? Joe, you got Match?
Joe, you got Candy? You Sum-Bitch,

You think I Crazy? I waste my Time?
I give you Trouble? Gimme a Dime!

WILLIAM JAY SMITH is the author of "Poems" (1947), "Celebration at Dark" (1950) and "Poems 1947-1957," and a number of well-known books of poems for children. He has for several years been poetry reviewer for "Harper's." "Poetry" awarded him prizes in 1945 and 1964.

AUGIE AND THE GUIDE

JACOB SLOAN

R. K. NARAYAN IS WIDELY REGARDED as the finest writer of English fiction living today in India. Impressively prolific, he has produced some hundred "tales."

Narayan has been appreciated by the critics from the first. Beginning in the '30's as a miniaturist of the South India small town, he widened his scope and deepened his thrust. In 1958 with *The Financial Expert*, he entered what the *New Statesman and Nation* called "the main stream of the great comic tradition."

But most recently, Narayan has acquired a mass audience as well. The film made out of his best-seller *The Guide* has been having long runs in Indian movie houses. Apparently, Narayan has been speaking directly to his compatriots, to be hitting their particular situation on the head. One wonders what a reflective Indian makes of the local boy's worldwide acclaim.

Perhaps he shakes his head lightly from right to left in that universal Indian gesture of ambiguous assent-cum-disclaimer ("If that's how you would have it. . . ."). He would certainly be too

polite to repudiate Anthony West's hand-clapping in *The New Yorker*: "Narayan has written, under the surface of the flashing light comedy that is his signature, a story that has the grandeur of the Indian scene and is a tragedy worthy of it."

Indians are far too aware both of the foibles of their superiors and the durability of their sweepers and bearers to take with complete seriousness such slogans as "grandeur" and "tragedy."

They accept the well-meaning flattery with a gentle quizzicalness. Such phrases are for the Gentiles to bestow and for the chosen people to suffer, as one suffers the heavy-handed praise of fools.

In a word, to the Indian reader, R. K. Narayan's success with *The Guide* must appear an unexpected, but certainly welcome, windfall—a sport of fate.

And to an American?

An American reader, strangely enough, puts down R. K. Narayan's novel, *The Guide*, with a sudden rush of familiarity.

Narayan and Bellow

Of course—*The Adventures of Augie March*! Railway Raju, the guide, is the Indian country cousin of the Chicago-born-and-bred, free-wheeling "I" of Saul Bellow's picaresque novel of the 1950's. Like Augie, Railway Raju gladly becomes what people want him to be. Perfectly adaptable, he is still never quite the chameleon—his very availability renders him unique, his openness is one quality he will never lose. He is the role-player incarnate.

But he is not an actor. Not exactly. He is the actor *manqué*, the failed artist. The real actor plays a part, but never becomes it. He retains some distance from the role. It is "the imagination" of which he is a "literalist," not reality. For drama, however realistic in detail, is in purpose symbolic. The actor does not represent, he presents.

True, Railway Raju, like Augie March, is a figure in literature and hence imagined. But they are not imagined as artists, however responsive they may be to their public audience. They go too far in their reaction to those they serve; they overact, they overidentify with their parts, their roles overwhelm them, their lives are filled to the exclusion of any other meaning than "to be." They must either "be" something other than themselves, or they deteriorate and die.

This is the high comedy and the light tragedy in both books, the wicked mockery and the surprising catastrophe. Railway Raju

turns guide because he cannot disappoint the expectations of tourists who, getting off at the Malgudi railway station, assume the presence of tourist attractions. Out of their needs for objects to tour, he develops a complete tourist industry.

Impressario, Not Actor

But it is not really a creation *ex nihilo*—the ancient monuments and relics do exist, and the tourists' perceptions and experiences, however banal, *are*. And Railway Raju is the first to admit that he is not a creative maker of things. He is a demonstrator, a participant-observer in life.

Yet he is at the same time peculiarly fascinated by those who do create, who truly perform. He becomes the impresario of his mistress, the classical dancer Rosie—as much out of his need to arrange the stage for her, the musical accompaniment, the scenery, the transportation, the hotel rooms, as out of her sheer drive to dance.

It is because he is not the actor himself, but the overinterested amenuensis, that he can all the while consciously watch himself at work: putting on the airs of a Svengali who evokes the dancer's magnificence with his magnetic eye, meeting with local bigwigs, running the apparatus of publicity and management.

Yet Railway Raju, this eminently imitative, parasitic, unoriginal man, this manipulator and operator, is passionately jealous of the source of his secondhand power, the arch-original compulsive artist. He wants Rosie entirely for himself, wants no one but himself to bask in her glory, to exploit and be exploited by her.

He commits a small crime to remove from her view even the vestigial memory of her betrayed and impotent husband, the indifferent art-historian. The crime is found out; Railway Raju goes to prison.

Augie's Anticlimax

Something very similar takes place in the *Adventures of Augie March*. Augie, too, wishes to possess entirely the woman who has possessed him for her purposes. He, too, has gladly and inevitably made his intelligence and ardour available to all interested comers: to Chicago's small-time politicians, neighbourhood gangsters, street-corner orator radicals.

And Augie, again like Railway Raju, keeps one part of himself

for himself—the vital part, the life-preserving part: his virility. Augie's mistress is obsessed with the occult science of falconry. The couple drive off to Mexico with a falcon she is determined to teach how to hunt. At the height of this remarkable adventure, the falcon disappoints, running, so to speak, counter to his own predatory nature—and at the same time Augie's mistress deserts him.

He collapses at this thinly disguised accusation of sexual failure. This is the turning point of his life. That of Railway Raju is the foolish forgery he commits to keep Rosie at the dance of which she has grown tired. It is at this decisive moment of their lives that Railway Raju and Augie March part company. The surface analogies cease.

In a surprising anticlimax, Augie March turns black marketeer, marries an actress with an ambiguous past, and lives uncomfortably in the constant shadow of her possible betrayal. He makes an uneasy peace with his world. We leave him, in an acrid epilogue, half the man he once was because so unsure of himself, his life without zest—the confiding nature confounded. His youth is gone and with it, not possibility, but the illusion of possibility—and the chief illusion of all, what W. H. Auden has called: "The error bred in the bone. . . . /Not universal love./ But to be loved alone."

God's Fool

Not so Railway Raju. He comes out of prison at loose ends, but quickly recovers his native stance. Peasants easily impose their credulity on him, persuading him to become a saint. He accedes, simply not to disabuse their trust. This is his ancient pattern: He has remained what he always was, fulfiller of all men's needs. There never was a break in his personality. In prison he had fitted perfectly into the concentration regime, a model prisoner, observing and enjoying the limitations of confinement.

So his sainthood runs to its predestined, consequential end, self-immolation as an imprecatory gesture towards the gods of nature. The unconventional man, because all-accepting, finally accepting the conventions of his land's spirituality. In a final self-immolation, he drowns in water only knee-high. The odour of salvation rain is in the air; he smells it as he dies. The scoundrel as glorious scapegoat recapitulating his people's millennial history. Railway Raju, God's fool, starves himself for the sake of a salvation he half believes in.

Augie March, however, made a fool of by his too-eager character,

survives into a wry middle age. A travelling salesman on shady deals between America and Europe, he stands lost in the middle of Dante's famous wood, but with a difference. For him there are no paths leading to any inferno he has not already visited.

His hell, like that of Milton's Lucifer, is one he carries with him wherever he goes. There is no transformation in sight. He remains what he has always been, perfectly secular, pragmatic, knowledgeable of what he is sure are the important things: not divine ends but human means, not myth or the reconstruction of society, but the shrewd manipulation of individuals through a careful study of motives.

It would be naive to draw a simple, one-to-one correspondence between the heroes of these two remarkable books, on the one hand, and the cultures from which they spring, on the other. Their very oddness precludes generalizing. The Chicagoan Augie March and the Malgudi guide are rare birds in their respective societies, sports of a kind. In their pre-eminent conformability to all men and all situations they conform to none.

Hovering between East and West

And yet the resemblances they suggest, the contrasts, and the interplay between resemblances and contrasts—these remind us of the omnipresent modern world where two unique cultures coexist.

First, Augie and Railway Raju share an uncommonly high degree of self-awareness, speak of themselves with a Boswellian candour. Both the Indian writer and the American have made a special effort to strip their writing to the bare bones. Bellow writes with a deliberate awkwardness, introducing a flavour of Yiddish idiom, hinting at a Jewish element in his overinvolved man with his feet firmly planted in the ground of other people's fantasies. Narayan has sharpened the edge of his wit. Working for the grand comedy effect, he has moved past the affecting rue, surprise turns, profound lightness of *The Financial Expert*, *Waiting for Mahatma*, *The Bachelor of Arts*, *The English Teacher*, the civilized wit of his occasional essays.

Finally, both writers, returning home to their childhood, tap the deepest roots of their society and age. The Indian Hindu's roots are in the village and the inexorable cycle of reincarnation, fate, prayer, and martyrdom, of which Railway Raju's slight career is so significant a parody. The American Jew's roots lie in the city and the millennial tradition of an urbane people, long resigned

to the hopeless wearing out of man's soul together with his body.

Railway Raju, the false saint, dies for an end he has reluctantly accepted because it is sanctioned by his religious culture: In the view of eternity, is the martyrdom true, the death efficacious? We must wait till the end of all incarnations to strike a final balance.

Augie March, the corrupted innocent Adam, moves reluctantly outside the Garden of Eden from which the knowledge of his own fallibility has expelled him. Irresponsible, passionate love has given way to sex and money. He knows there will be for him no revelation in the Sinai desert, no manifestation of grace. He is, finally, his own man—but that is not enough. He does not believe in metempsychosis.

Balance the voluntary but uninterested martyrdom against the involuntary, self-willed independence—Railway Raju against Augie March—do you have the modern world in uneasy scales, hovering between East and West?

JACOB SLOAN is the editor of the *"American Reporter."* He has written extensively on American literature, and is himself the author of a book of poetry, *"Generation of Journey,"* 1944. In 1961-62, he was a Fulbright Research Scholar at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, preparing material for a book on Israeli culture. Books he has edited and translated include Emmanuel Ringelblum's classic *"Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto,"* and Isaac Bashevis Singer's short novel, *"Satan in Goray."* For his translation of Nobel-Prize-winner S. Y. Agnon's *"Days of Awe,"* he received the Louis La Med Prize.

MEMENTOES OF A VISIT TO AMERICA

THE SKETCHES on the following pages were drawn, on the run, by Vishnu Wakankar during a recent three-month visit to the United States.

As Archaeologist-in-Charge at Vikram University, he visited several hundred U.S. archaeological sites—perhaps more than any other single person has ever seen.


As head of Bharati Kala Bhawan in Ujjain, he made hundreds of quick sketches of American life, people, and scenery.

As a guest of the U.S. Department of State, he gave many lectures on Indian archaeology—principally in his very special field of Stone Age Rock Shelter Paintings.

These sketches are reproduced not as great works of art but as deft mementoes of a remarkable journey.



Canyon du Chelly




The bridge at Niagara Falls



New York skyline from Central Park



The George Washington Bridge



The United Nations and Midtown New York skyline



Some early Americans


A later American




Navajo Hojan (hut), Arizona



The University of Pittsburgh




The United States Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.




L.H.

L.T.


The Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C.




A copper smelter



Open pit copper mine, Arizona



Harvard University boat-house, Cambridge, Massachusetts



The Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

THE FIRST SERVICE ECONOMY

VICTOR R. FUCHS

THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PIONEERING in a new stage of economic growth. At some point during the past decade, this country became the first "service economy"—that is, it became the first nation in which more than half of the employed population was not involved in the production of food, clothing, houses, automobiles, or other tangible goods.

In 1947, employment stood at approximately fifty-eight million. Now it is about seventy-two million. Virtually all of this increase occurred in industries that provide services, e.g., schools, hospitals, retail stores, banks. The number employed in the production of goods has been relatively stable: modest increases in manufacturing and construction have been offset by declines in agriculture and mining.

The Growth of Services

Numerous dramatic examples of the growth of services are readily available:

Item: The *increase* in employment in the field of education

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between 1950 and 1960 was greater than the total employed in the steel, copper, and aluminium industries.

Item: The *increase* in employment in the field of health between 1950 and 1960 was greater than the total employed in automobile manufacturing.

Item: The *increase* in employment in financial firms between 1950 and 1960 was greater than total employment in mining in 1960.

Although the shift to services has been particularly rapid in the postwar period, similar trends have been evident for at least the past century in this country, and can also be observed in most growing economies. Colin Clark, in 1940, characterized the movement of labour from agriculture to manufacture, and from manufacture to commerce and services, as "The most important concomitant of economic progress."

Changing Patterns of Spending and Output

When we seek an explanation for this drastic shift of employment, two principal answers are suggested. The first concerns the relation between spending patterns and levels of income. As income rises, it is argued, the demand for goods tends to rise less rapidly than the demand for services; hence, the share of services in total output will rise.

With respect to some goods, notably food, the facts clearly support the theory. As Adam Smith noted in *The Wealth of Nations*, "The desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach." Whether this is true for goods in general, is less clear. While the demand for any particular goods, such as automobiles or radios, may reach a point where further increases in income do not trigger much additional buying, new goods, such as pleasure boats or TV sets, frequently appear to take up the slack.

The other principal explanation is that output per man grows more rapidly in goods production than in services. Therefore, even when the shares of output remain the same, relatively fewer workers will be needed in the goods sector and the remainder *must* find employment in services. The available evidence strongly suggests that output per man has indeed risen a great deal more rapidly in goods industries than in services.

We cannot be certain of this, however, or even about what has

happened to relative shares of real output, because in many of the services it is extremely difficult to measure changes in output. The output of wheat farmers can be measured easily in bushels of wheat, but how can we measure changes in the output of doctors, teachers, or social workers?

As the activities of these people absorb an increasing share of our total resources, it will become more difficult to make precise statements about trends in real output or productivity, and *our statistics of real Gross National Product will become increasingly less satisfactory for measuring economic welfare*. I shall return to this point later.

Perhaps of greater interest than the causes of the shift to a service economy are some of the possible results of the fact that the shift has taken place.

The Changing Size and Ownership of Firms

Consider, for example, the implications of the fact that the size of the "firm" and the nature of ownership and control are typically different in the goods-producing and service sectors.

In the production of goods, with some notable exceptions such as agriculture and construction, most of the output is accounted for by large profit-seeking corporations. Ownership is frequently separate from management, and significant market power is often held by a few firms in each industry.

In the service sector, on the other hand, and again with some exceptions, firms are typically small, are usually owner-managed, and are often non-corporate. Furthermore, *non-profit* operations, both public and private, account for one-third of the service sector's employment.

Table 1 summarizes some of the available information concerning the distribution of employment by size of employer, in different service industries. The size distribution in manufacturing is included for comparison.

It will be seen that in wholesale trade, retail trade, and selected services, accounting for more than fifty per cent of the service sector, half of the employment is in companies with fewer than twenty workers. In finance, insurance, and real estate, forty per cent is found in very small firms. And another large fraction of service sector employment is accounted for by self-employed professionals and domestic servants, not shown in the table.

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Employment by Size of Firm or Employer
in Manufacturing and Selected Service Industries

				Employment Size	
				Fewer Than 20	Fewer Than 500
1.	Manufacturing (1958)	...	...	7%	38%
2.	Wholesale trade (1958)	...	...	47	93
3.	Retail trade (1958)	...	...	56	78
4.	Selected services (1958)	...	...	57	87
5.	Finance, insurance, and real estate (1956)			41	67
6.	Hospitals (non-governmental) (1963)	...	...	n.a.	52
7.	Local government (1962)	...	...	n.a.	49

Sources: 1-4. Bureau of the Census, *Enterprise Statistics: 1958 Part I, General Report*, p. 30, adjusted to include self-employed proprietors by assuming that they are in firms with fewer than 20 employees.

5. Betty C. Churchill, "Size of Business Firms," *Survey of Current Business*, Sept. 1959, p. 19, adjusted for self-employed proprietors as rows 1-4.

6. American Hospital Association, *Hospitals*, Guide Issue 1964, estimated from distributions by number of beds.

7. *Census of Government, Compendium of Government Employment 1962*, estimated in part.

n.a. = not available.

Private (i.e., non-government) hospitals are considerably larger than the typical service firm, but even they have more than half their total employment in hospitals with fewer than 500 employees. Similarly, only a few private schools or colleges could be classified as large.

Government as a "Small" Employer

Government, which is often referred to as a "huge bureaucracy," actually includes many small employers. It is worth noting that

employment at the local level of government now exceeds that of state and federal (civilian) government combined. One-half of this local employment is truly "local"—i.e., it is in governmental units with fewer than 500 employees.

The End of the Myth of the Large Corporation

One statistic that epitomizes what has been happening to the American economy is the percentage of the national income originating in business corporations. Ever since the development of the private corporation, its role in the economy has tended to grow—but its relative importance apparently reached a peak about 1955, when corporations accounted for 55.8 per cent of total national income. Since then, this fraction has declined, and in 1963 the level was 53.8 per cent, approximately the same as it was in 1948. As these facts and trends become better known, we may see an end to the myth of the dominance of the large corporation in our society.

In fact, large corporations are not and have never been the dominant form of American enterprise. Most people do not work, and never have worked, for large corporations; most production does not take place and never has taken place in large corporations. This assumption was primarily based on extrapolation of trends from the nineteenth century, but the trend is now reversed and this assumption is no longer tenable.

In the future, the large corporation is likely to be overshadowed by the hospitals, universities, research institutes, government agencies, and professional organizations that are the hallmarks of a service economy.

New Problems of Regulation and Efficiency

Industries such as trade and services, in which small firms account for the bulk of the output, do not present "monopoly" problems of the classic "trust-busting" variety. On the other hand, the growth of such industries may increase the need to guard against the restrictive practices of trade associations and professional organizations.

Small firms may pose another problem for the economy because it is alleged that they do not allocate sufficient resources to research, and other activities with large external benefits.

Unlike goods, many services are typically provided by non-profit institutions. The growing importance of such organizations will

THE FIRST SERVICE ECONOMY

probably pose some disturbing questions about how to promote efficiency and equity. If we ever reach the stage where non-profit operations tend to dominate the economy, we will be faced with the need for radically new instruments of regulation and control to supplement the motives for efficiency based on competition and the drive for profits.

New Hope for Women, Old Folks, and Students

Some of the most startling comparisons that can be made between the goods and service sectors concern the characteristics of their respective labour forces. (See Table 2.) One simple but profound difference is that many occupations in the service sector do not make special demands for physical strength. This means that women can compete on more nearly equal terms with men, perhaps for the first time in history. In services we find women holding down almost one-half of all jobs, compared with only one-fifth in the goods sector.

TABLE 2

Labour Force Characteristics, Goods, and Service Sectors, 1960

Characteristic	As Percentage of Sector Employment	
	Goods	Service
1. All employed ^a	100	100
2. Females	19	46
3. Over 65	4	5
4. Part-timers	19	27
5. Self-employed	13	13
6. Union members	48	7
7. More than 12 years of school	13	30
8. Fewer than 9 years of school	38	22

Source: Rows 1-5. *U.S. Census of Population, 1960.*

Row 6. H. G. Lewis, *Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States*, Chicago, 1963, p. 251.

Rows 7,8. *U.S. Census of Population, 1960, 1/1000 sample.*

^a Data in this table for civilian employment only; unpaid family workers are included.

The ultimate effects of this simple change could be very far-reaching. Man's superior economic position has been based in part on his superior physical strength, which gave him an advantage over woman in many occupations. To be sure, the higher male earnings are also the result of his firmer and more continuous attachment to the labour force and to women's role in child-bearing. But to the extent that they are based on physical strength, the advent of a service economy should make for greater equality between the sexes.

Because physical strength is less important, we also find proportionately more older workers in services. This is in spite of the fact that the more rapidly growing sector would normally tend to have a younger work force. An additional reason women and older workers are attracted to the service sector is that it provides greater opportunities for part-time employment. Trade and services, in particular, have employed many part-timers and the number has grown appreciably in the postwar period.

The use of part-timers contributes significantly to the efficient operation of service firms because demand in many cases is uneven, with peaks coming at particular hours of the day, particular days of the week, and particular weeks and months of the year. Fortunately, there are increasing numbers of married women, older men, and students who desire less than full-time employment; therefore it is possible for service firms to meet peak demands without having a great deal of idle labour at other times.

Effects on Self-Employment

The situation with respect to self-employment is complex. According to the 1960 *Census of Population*, goods and services have approximately equal numbers of self-employed. But agriculture accounts for the lion's share (sixty-three per cent) of self-employment in the goods sector, while self-employment opportunities in services are widespread (with the exception of government and non-profit institutions).

It is widely believed that opportunities for self-employment are diminishing in the United States; but if one excludes the decline of agriculture, this is no longer true. In recent years, due largely to the growth of services, the self-employed have grown in absolute numbers and have remained a constant fraction of total non-agricultural employment.

The role of self-employment in the future will be determined

by several conflicting trends. A continued shift to services will certainly favour self-employment, but this may be offset by the influx of young workers and women into the labour force, since these groups are predominantly wage and salary workers. There may also be some tendency towards larger firms within each individual service industry. But on the whole, there is little reason to think that opportunities for self-employment will narrow so long as the service sector continues to grow.

Effects on Trade Unions

Given the importance of females, part-time employment, students, and self-employment in the service sector, it is not surprising to find a vast difference in the importance of unions in the two sectors. The service industries thus far have not responded very enthusiastically to organizing efforts, and the continued growth of services may mean a decline in union influence in the United States. On the other hand, if unions become successful in organizing the service sector to the same extent as the goods sector, we may see a significant change in the nature of the union movement itself.

Higher Education and Personalization

The last two rows of Table 2 reveal interesting differences in the educational requirements for goods and services. The service industries make much greater use of workers with higher education, and make relatively less use of those with only limited schooling. This is not true for all service industries, of course, but is true for the sector on average.

There is another implication concerning labour which is not readily apparent in the statistics but which is potentially of considerable importance. For many decades, we have been hearing that industrialization has "alienated" the worker from his work, that the individual has no contact with the final fruit of his labour, and that the transfer from a craft society to one of mass production has resulted in depersonalization and in the loss of ancient skills and virtues.

Whatever validity such statements may have had in the past, a question arises whether they now accord with reality. For the advent of a service economy implies a reversal of these trends. Employees in many service industries are closely related to the

final product of their work and often render a highly personalized service, of a kind that offers ample scope for the development and exercise of personal skills.

This is true of some goods-producing occupations as well, but there is little doubt that personal contact between consumer and worker occurs more frequently in services. Of course, even within many service industries there is some tendency for work to become less personalized (e.g., teaching machines in education, self-service counters in retailing, and laboratory tests in medicine); but with more and more people becoming engaged in service occupations, the net effects for the labour force as a whole may be in the direction of the *personalization of work*.

It should be stressed that the possibility of deriving satisfaction from a job well done, and of taking pride in one's work, are only prospects—not certainties. Teachers can ignore their pupils; doctors can think more of their bank balances than of their patients. The salesman who must go through life with an artificial smile on his face while caring little for his customers and less for what he sells will not disappear. But at their best, many service occupations are extremely rewarding and in many of them in the line between "work" and "leisure" activity is often difficult to draw.

Automation and Satisfactions of Work

The preceding remarks suggest the need to re-examine current stereotyped thinking to the effect that automation results in the depersonalization of work. One reason people have come to this erroneous conclusion is that they have been looking in the wrong place. They have been looking at the impact of automation where it occurs and noting that machinery and controls (highly impersonal) take over work that was formerly done by human labour.

But the real impact of automation is to remove people from relatively monotonous routine, impersonal work and replace them on others in a rapidly growing type of work which is typically of a much more personal character.

Domestic Service

It is true, of course, that some service occupations—e.g., domestic service—are not well regarded in the United States. This may be the result of cultural lag, rooted in the level and distribu-

tion of income that prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When the average level of per capita income in a country is low, the amount of personal services rendered is probably a function of the (highly unequal) distribution of income; it is probably also related to social immobility and inequality of opportunity. Typically, in such circumstances, these services are rendered by the low-born and the poor to the privileged classes and the wealthy.

It can be argued, however, that there is nothing inherently degrading in personal services. In a country with a high average level of income, one would expect that a large amount of personal service will be consumed and that a large number of people will find profitable employment in that way. (This would be true even if the income distribution were completely egalitarian.) For high per capita income implies high average output per man. This is likely to mean *very* high output per man in some industries (where capital can be substituted for labour, and technological change is rapid).

Employment will probably increase in industries, such as personal services, where output per man advances slowly. Our attitudes towards personal services are not immutable laws of nature; they can be changed. Such a change would, I suspect, reduce unemployment and increase consumer satisfaction.

Variability in Employment

Mention of unemployment recalls the fact that there is much less of it in the service industries than in goods. One reason is that the demand for services is more stable over the business cycle. Because services cannot be stored, this sector avoids the swings in output that result from changes in the rate at which business firms and consumers add to or diminish their inventories of goods.

Even for equal cyclical changes in output, moreover, there is evidence that service employment is more stable. In retail trade, for example, the cyclical swings of output are much greater than those of manhours, whereas in manufacturing the two tend to move together.

Reasons for the discrepancy between output and manhours in trade (and other services) can be found in the nature of the labour force.

First, there are large numbers of self-employed; their employ-

ment is almost completely insensitive to cyclical fluctuations in output.

Second, the role of salaried employees, as opposed to hourly workers, is much larger in services than it is in goods. Also, the educational level is higher and the costs of hiring are probably greater. All of this means that dismissals or lay-offs during temporary recessions will be less frequent.

Finally, it should be noted that there is a substantial number of service industry employees classified as "wage and salary workers" who are actually compensated on a "piecework" basis. Their wages in whole or in part are determined by their output, and take the form of commissions, tips, or a share of "profits." Employers have little reason to fire such employees when business falls off. This group includes real-estate brokers, insurance and security brokers, waiters and waitresses, barbers and beauticians, and most salesmen of durable goods.

Because their earnings are more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in spending than are their hours of work, these workers have "flexible" wages rather than variable employment.

Measuring Productivity in Services

Earlier, I referred to the difficulty of measuring changes in output and productivity in the service industries. This difficulty arises partly because the services have not received much attention from economists or statisticians in the past. Even at present, the statistical resources of the government are concentrated on agriculture, mining, and manufacturing to an excessive degree. Reallocation of research resources would help, but there are fundamental conceptual problems as well.

Consider, for example, the fact that in services the consumer frequently plays an important role in the production process. Sometimes, as in the barber's chair, the role is essentially passive. In such cases the only conceptual adjustment called for is to recognize that the time of the consumer is also a scarce resource.

But in the supermarket and laundromat the consumer actually works, and in the doctor's office the quality of the medical history the patient gives may influence significantly the productivity of the doctor. Productivity in banking is affected by whether it is made out correctly or not. This, in turn, is likely to be a function of the education of the customer, among other factors.

Productivity in education, as every teacher knows, is deter-

mined largely by what the student contributes and, to take an extreme case, the performance of a string quartet can be affected by the audience's response. Thus, we see that productivity in many service industries is dependent in part on the knowledge, experience, and motivation of the consumer.

Think what would happen to service industry productivity in the United States if technology, capital, and labour inputs remained as they are but the consumers were exchanged for 190 million consumers chosen at random from some other country or group of countries.

Productivity, Honesty, and Self-Help

In a similar vein, productivity can be, and often is, affected by the level of honesty of the consumer. If consumers can be trusted to refrain from stealing merchandise, to report prices and costs properly at check-out counters, to honour verbal commitments for purchases and other contracts, etc., there can be tremendous savings in personnel on the part of producers of services.

These savings are probably important when comparisons are made with productivity in other countries or with the same country at different points in time. It may be that qualities such as honesty are themselves functions of the general level of productivity and income. A full analysis therefore requires consideration of these interrelations—but the tools and data necessary for such analysis do not exist at present.

A similar problem is posed by "do-it-yourself" and other types of "home" or "non-market" production. Paid labour is becoming a decreasing fraction of all time spent in productive activity. A small increase in wage rates has been more than offset by decreases in average hours per week and increases in vacations and holidays. Some of the increased free time may be spent in pure leisure, but probably the bulk of it is spent in the non-market production of goods and services as well as in consumer participation in the market production of services. As I have already suggested, how well or poorly these activities are carried out will surely influence economic well-being.

G.N.P. as a Measure of Well-being

Economists have long been aware that the significance of real Gross National Product as a measure of output and of economic

well-being will vary, depending upon the level of economic development. There has been a presumption that the more highly developed the economy the more useful the measure becomes. Simon Kuznets, one of the founding fathers of national income accounting, wrote: "The importance of domestic activities relative to those that are part of the business system declines in the long run."

When this was written, a quarter of a century ago, it was probably true that the higher the real G.N.P. the more reliable it was as a measure of economic welfare. But the trend may now be in the other direction, because at very high levels of G.N.P. per capita a large fraction of productive effort is devoted to services (where real output is very difficult to measure) and to other activities (that are not measured at all).

An increase in home production, at the expense of labour in the market, reduces measured output because the former is mostly not included in the Gross National Product. If the outputs and inputs of home production were included, growth of this type of activity would probably tend to reduce measured productivity, because of the absence of specialization and of economies of scale. On the other hand, true economic welfare might be increased by such a shift if, as seems likely, labour in the market is less pleasurable than labour in home production.

I conclude that, even as we increase our efforts to measure real output in the service sector, we must recognize that these efforts are likely to leave considerable margins of uncertainty. The study of growth and productivity in a service economy will surely require the development of auxiliary measures of "output" and economic welfare to be used in conjunction with the familiar Gross National Product.

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BOOK WORLD

*PLANNING IN CHINESE AGRICULTURE:
SOCIALIZATION AND THE PRIVATE
SECTOR, 1956-1962*

by Kenneth R. Walker

*xvii plus 109 pp. Frank Cass and Co., Ltd.,
London, 1965. 25s.*

*MARKET CONTROL AND PLANNING
IN COMMUNIST CHINA*

by Dwight H. Perkins

*viii plus 291 pp. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966. \$7.00*

Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein

On October 1 the Chinese Communist regime celebrated the seventeenth anniversary of its birth. This gives a perspective of close to two decades for examining the character of Chinese Communist economic policy—its strengths and its weaknesses—and the effectiveness with which it has been translated into actual economic performance for the attainment of the regime's economic and political

goals.

One of the most striking characteristics of China's economic performance in these past seventeen years is its apparent success during the first decade of its existence, marked by consistent and sustained economic growth, in sharp contrast with prolonged stagnation in the second decade.

China's average rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1957 may be estimated as roughly six to seven per cent per year, with perhaps a doubling of this rate between 1957 and 1958.

Reprinted from *Current Scene*, Hong Kong,
November 25, 1966.

This was followed, however, by a decline and then a gradual recovery so that all indications seem to point to a situation where, as of 1965, China's national product may have just recovered to the peak 1958 level. On this assumption, the average rate of economic expansion in China between 1952 and 1965 would be no more than about three per cent per year.

On the face of it, this is not an impressive performance. Although China's rate of growth is often considered much faster than India's, on these assumptions they are roughly the same.

Should further investigations validate this assumption of an average rate of growth of about three per cent for 1952 to 1965, our whole view of Chinese Communist economic performance will have to be reassessed.

Most economic analysts have consciously or unconsciously tended to think of China's economic development in terms of the experience of the 50's. They have viewed the "Great Leap Forward" (1958) and its aftermath as a temporary aberration born of policy and planning errors and compounded by bad weather and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians.

However, it is perhaps time to ask whether these factors are really so temporary or whether there are some longer-run forces at work. Can one take it for granted that, in the absence of the policy errors of the Great Leap, the Chinese economy could have proceeded on the growth path of the First Five-Year Plan?

Inputs and Outputs

How can one reconcile a three per cent growth rate with the enormous outpouring of energy, effort, and dislocation that accompanied it during these past seventeen years? Can this perhaps be explained

in terms of far-reaching inefficiencies in the system, with very high input-output ratios?

The problem is complicated by the fact that it is often not easy to distinguish between input and output. This certainly was the case during the Great Leap when "production" increased very rapidly. A sizable portion of the output was of such low quality that it could not be used either for consumption, for investment, or as raw material for further processing.

Though something was produced, the utility generated was very low, in some cases negligible and occasionally even negative. Yet inevitably, many of our assessments were based on data which, at least in part, reflected inputs—efforts expended—rather than output, outcomes, and results.

Furthermore, not only resource inputs but organizational, propaganda, and political inputs were very high as well. That is, not only is there a large commitment of labour, capital, land, and raw materials to the productive process, but there is also a large-scale mobilization of party cadres using a wide range of propaganda instruments designed to accomplish specific economic tasks.

This tendency was most pronounced during the Great Leap, but it certainly has not been absent since, nor was it unknown before. This would suggest that both the economic input-output ratio and the political inputs into the production process are high. How can one explain this low degree of efficiency and this apparent paradox?

Underlying Conflict

At the risk of oversimplification, the development process in China since 1949 could be seen as a confrontation between Chinese Communist ideology and China's

economic backwardness. Another way of stating the same proposition is that we are witnessing a confrontation between Mao's Utopia for the future and China's economic realities—particularly as evidenced by a high degree of population pressure, rapid population growth, and a low per capita food supply.

Central in Mao's cosmology is a vision of man fully committed to a tremendous outpouring of effort, fully committed to the building of a new society, and subordinating his own personal material desires and strivings to higher ends. Granting that not all men are fully committed to this path, in Mao's view they can all be shaped by proper ideology and organization—provided that the Communist cadres are thoroughly imbued with ideological zeal so that they can perform the necessary leadership, propaganda, and organization roles.

There is ample documentation in Chinese Communist leadership statements, including those by Mao, to suggest that economic development is viewed as a series of obstacles which can be overcome through campaigns very similar to military conquests. In the case of military ventures, Mao adheres to the doctrine of "man over weapons," just as in economic development he believes in "man over machines."

This, of course, does not mean a rejection of modern military and industrial production technology. It merely indicates that if a choice must be made, much higher priority would have to be accorded to human inputs, to human commitment, rather than to technical inputs. As Chalmers Johnson has aptly pointed out,¹ Mao seems to believe that guerrilla techniques and guerrilla-like approaches are just as

applicable to the economy as they are to the field of battle.

There is, of course, no doubt that over a certain range human commitment and organization can serve as a substitute for technical inputs. This is particularly true where labour-intensive instead of capital-intensive technologies can be used. However, there are many types of production which can only be mounted by modern techniques requiring high equipment and skill inputs.

Similarly, there are many lines of production where the efficiency of complex technical processes is so superior to those of primitive and preponderantly labour-intensive processes that exclusive or primary reliance on the latter might involve considerable sacrifice in the rate of economic growth.

Problem of Motivation

From Mao's point of view, perhaps the central problem is one of human motivation. Given his objectives and his vision of Utopia, the optimal development path would be one in which consumer standards of living would remain more or less stationary. All of the increases in per capita output could then be ploughed back into further development, without the masses of the people laying any claim on the fruits thereof.

To put it in a different way, the Chinese Communist leadership would like to motivate the Chinese people into a pattern of behaviour responding to normative and coercive appeals.² The peasantry and the population at large, however, seem to have been responding more readily to material rewards, which the leadership

¹ Chalmers Johnson, "Lin Piao's Army and Its Role in Chinese Society, Part I," *Current Scene*, July 1, 1966.

² I am indebted to Professor W. G. Skinner for developing these concepts in an as yet unpublished paper entitled "Leadership and Compliance in Communist China."

is reluctant to use.

Therefore the political and economic history of Communist China, from one point of view, could be written in terms of a continuing conflict between the population's bias for remunerative appeals and the leadership's bias for normative and coercive appeals.

This divergence leads to dilemmas for the leadership and to a continuous veering back and forth between these different types of appeal. This phenomenon of veering back and forth may be one of the factors that tend to produce a cyclical pattern of policy. At the same time, the lack of congruence between leadership appeals and popular acceptance may in large part explain the inefficiency that seems to characterize Communist China's economic system.

Hidden Factors

In appraising this performance, our main criterion has been economic growth as measured by indicators such as national product, national income, industrial production, or agricultural production indices. It is quite possible, however, that alternative criteria might be applied which would attempt to take account of economic, political, and social change; i.e., change in attitudes, receptiveness to innovation and modernization. These elements are naturally very hard to measure. Moreover, their impact on economic growth may become apparent only some time in the future.

It may very well be that Communist China's rapid economic growth during the first decade was greatly facilitated by fuller utilization of latent and poorly utilized resources of the mainland economy. This improvement in the degree of utilization, at a more or less given level of technology, could have resulted from

the institution of public order or unity in the country and much better economic and political organization.

But as the gain from this type of phenomenon became dissipated, the system bumped against some real ceilings which could only be removed by far-reaching modernization and technical innovation. This, in turn, required a new range of skills and attitudes.

Seen in this light, the campaigns and political inputs of the '60's might in historical retrospect be viewed as measures which were necessary to prepare the ground for future economic growth, although they led to an economic decline during the second decade of Communist rule in China.

Two Books

The two books under review here throw a great deal of light on the phenomena outlined above. Dwight Perkins, in particular, shows the basic dilemmas facing the Chinese Communists due to their ideological predilections, their commitment to political control and power, and their heavy industry emphasis amidst a backward agriculture subjected to acute population pressure.

These considerations also permeate Kenneth Walker's study, in which he very clearly and very convincingly brings out the cyclical character of Chinese Communist agricultural policy, with an advance-retreat-advance cycle inherent in Mao's fundamental dilemma.

Walker argues that this is a consciously thought-out strategy on the part of the Chinese Communist regime. According to him, it is a strategy that involves moving to an extreme position, retreating when necessary, and coming to rest temporarily at a position still in advance of the original point. He believes it is not inconceivable

therefore that just as the advances were planned, so were the retreats. One cannot help but wonder at this.

There is no doubt that one can find in Chinese Communist policy statements, as well as in economic journals, long expositions concerning the wave-like pattern of development. It is far from clear, however, whether this is not merely a rationalization of the actual pattern of development as it has emerged, rather than a clearly articulated method of locating the optimal growth path for the economy.

New Insights

Both of these books are first-rate contributions to our understanding of Communist China's economic policy, the functioning of the economic system, and the system of economic organization. In many ways the publication of these two books marks a new phase in the development of Chinese economic studies.

Up to this time, the central preoccupation seems to have been with growth, with measures of development, either for the economy as a whole or for some of the principal sectors, particularly for industry. We still have no really adequate measure of the rate of growth in agriculture.

These two studies, in contrast, look at the functioning of the system and assess its performance in those terms. In a sense we see a shift in preoccupation from studies of morphology and growth to studies of physiology and to analyses of the behavioural aspects of the system.

Both studies are based on meticulous research, wide use of sources, thorough immersion in Chinese economic reality, and imaginative analysis of the evidence. Both deal with the relative roles of the public and private sectors in the system and institutions used and available for exercising control over the economic

system.

The title of each book is somewhat misleading since neither really deals with planning as usually defined. That is, these are not studies of the planning mechanism and the system of economic planning in Communist China. They are not intended as analyses of the planning process, the way the targets are formulated, the system of material balances, the methods of achieving consistency in the plan, nor the various institutional means for enforcing particular plan targets and eliciting plan performance.

Rather, the central issues with which these two studies come to grips are: the scope of the market and the price mechanism as resource allocators in the Chinese economy; the role of the private sector; the effectiveness with which commodities and factors are allocated by bureaucratic means rather than through the market; and the degree to which economic decisions are implemented through centralized controls.

As Walker's title suggests, his focus is narrower since he is primarily concerned with the importance and role of the private sector, and particularly of the private plots in Chinese agriculture. Perkins, on the other hand, treats this issue but is concerned with the problems of centralized versus market controls, not only in agriculture but in other sectors as well.

Planning in Agriculture

Kenneth Walker's book is small but important. It illustrates extremely well how a sharply focused microstudy can illuminate the functioning of the system as a whole.

Before this study was published, students of the Chinese economy were aware of the fact that the private plot is an important factor in motivating peas-

ants, in providing them with incentives, and in serving as a source of supplementary food supply, particularly meat, fruits, and vegetables. Until this study appeared, however, it was not possible to attach any precise dimensions to the importance of the private plot; nor was it quite clear just what its various roles were. This is where the main contribution of this book lies.

The book is divided into six chapters with an introduction and some concluding remarks. Chapter I is a brief survey of institutional transformation in Chinese agriculture from land reform to the communes. This is background and not intended to contribute anything new. Nevertheless, even in this section the author clarifies a number of important points which have not been so sharply defined before.

For instance, he makes it clear that the process of institutional change in Chinese agriculture involved the superimposition of larger planning and organizational units on those already existing. Thus the first unit in the history of Chinese collectivization was a mutual aid team of five to eight households. A number of such teams were then amalgamated into producers' co-operatives with an average of thirty to forty households each.

In these cooperatives, however, the mutual aid teams retained some form of identity, which continues up to the present day as the production teams in the communes. Several of these cooperatives were then amalgamated into collectives or producers' cooperatives of the advanced type, with an average of 100 to 300 households in each.

These collectives, in turn, had a three-tier system of organization: the collective, the production brigade, and the production team.

Finally, the commune represented an

amalgamation of a number of collectives with a four-tier system: namely, the commune; the large production brigade, which was equivalent to the former collective; the small production brigade, which corresponded to the former co-operative; and the production team, which is more or less the successor of the mutual aid team.

This form of organization provided maximum flexibility. It also explains the rapidity with which transformations took place from one form to another. At the same time, it would seem that the changes involved in going from one form to another may not have been as far-reaching as has frequently been suggested.

The critical issue was not so much the particular form of organization but the degree of centralization versus decentralization in resource allocation and income distribution. Thus the principal difficulty of the communes was perhaps not their large size but the fact that during the Great Leap the commune centre assumed many of the resource allocation and income distribution responsibilities. This led to excessive centralization and misallocation with the attendant effects on food production that are by now very familiar.

The Private Plot

Chapter II analyses the economic importance of the private sector to the Chinese peasantry. It shows that the private plot, which could encompass no more than five per cent of the arable land area, contributed at least fourteen per cent of the caloric intake of the average Chinese peasant household. Moreover, this contribution is of very great marginal significance from a nutritional point of view.

The private plot is a major producer

of livestock products, fruits, and vegetables. Therefore the calories produced on this small land area make an extremely important contribution to improving the nutritional quality and balance of the Chinese diet.

The private plots have also served as the principal centres for hog raising. Over eighty per cent of the pigs were raised on private plots in mid-1956. Most of the poultry is similarly raised. For all of these reasons combined, the bulk of organic fertilizer produced in the countryside also comes from the private plot.

The private sector in agriculture also provides an important source of cash income to the farm household. While it is difficult to estimate the income derived from this source, according to Walker it could very easily be the decisive factor in affecting the peasant's standard of living.

In sum, Walker points out that the private sector performed four main functions in Chinese agriculture: First, it provided the kinds of foods needed for a balanced diet. Second, it raised the standard of living from marginal subsistence to a tolerable level. Third, it was a source of cash. Fourth, it gave some degree of security to the peasant household, in contrast to the uncertainties attached to the collective.

In Competition

The third chapter examines the economic significance of the private sector to the government:

The private plots, as already indicated, constituted a major source of organic manure, the fertilizer base for the collectivized sector. They also represented, and still do, a principal source of supplementary food supply: pork, poultry, fruits, and vegetables. These products, in turn, play a role in guaranteeing the nutritional

quality of the Chinese diet, not only for the peasantry but for the urban population also.

However, this manure and these food-stuffs could be produced on the plots only at the cost of competition between the private and the collectivized sector for labour, management skills, and fertilizer. Therefore from the regime's point of view the ideal situation would be one in which the private plots would be collectivized. The products raised on them could thus be brought more directly within the reach of government control. The pressures in this direction were present all the time.

Four Phases

The history of collectivization and communization could be written in terms of the changing pressures on the private sector. This is developed by Walker in Chapters IV-VI, in which he traces four phases in the evolution of Chinese Communist Government policy vis-a-vis the private sector and agriculture in general.

Phase one encompasses the period from mid-1955 to the end of 1956, which marked the high tide of collectivization. During this period the private sector was not abolished, but under the impact of rapid collectivization it was hard pressed. These pressures took a variety of forms, such as reduction in the size of the private plots; collectivization of resources still privately owned by the peasants, e.g. trees, farm implements, and livestock; undervaluation of organic fertilizer delivered by the peasants to the collective; and, in some cases, lack of compensation for these fertilizer deliveries.

This policy led to marked reduction in pig numbers, a general decline in the production of the private plots and a corresponding decline in the output of organic fertilizer, with adverse consequences for all

of agriculture, including the collectivized sector.

As a result, during the second phase, the regime beat a tactical retreat, which was most pronounced in the spring of 1957 during the period of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. The scope of the private sector was widened once more; the size of the plots in some cases was increased; the price of pigs and of pork meat was raised; fertilizer deliveries were paid for; and so on.

But beginning in late 1957, under the impact of changing economic policies which became fully crystallized during the Great Leap, the private sector was hard pressed once more—to the point that private plots were abolished in 1958.

This third phase lasted until about the winter of 1960 when the Great Leap was abandoned. The abolition of the private plots had negative incentive effects on the peasantry. It led to a drastic reduction in meat, fruit, and vegetable production, and contributed to a decline in the qualitative level of diet. The agricultural failures of the Great Leap forced a re-evaluation of agricultural policy and a re-institution of the private plots beginning in 1961.

Up to this point, I find myself in more or less complete agreement with Walker's analysis. It is only in the concluding section that Walker makes some general observations about the character of Chinese Communist policy that I find less than convincing. I doubt very much that the imbalances and disproportions which arose during the Great Leap and the earlier collectivization campaign were planned for by the Chinese Communist leadership, as Walker suggests. Actually most indications point to the contrary.

As one surveys the evolution of Chinese Communist economic policy, particularly from the vantage point of late 1966, one

cannot help but be struck by many elements of irrationality that seem to have been present during the Great Leap and again in 1965-1966.

Market Control and Planning

Dwight Perkins' book represents a highly sophisticated analysis of market versus non-market controls in agriculture, industry, wholesaling, retailing, and in the allocation of labour resources. It is an analysis of considerable breadth, which takes account not only of the strictly economic factors but also examines the role of ideology, political power, and control variables in shaping Chinese Communist economic policy and its implementation.

The study gains in breadth inasmuch as the author draws heavily on the comparative Soviet perspective and thus is able to illuminate more sharply the pattern of economic policy behaviour in Communist China.

Perkins uses a wide variety of sources and many different types of evidence—official documents, a variety of other first-hand sources, secondary works about the Chinese economy and related aspects of Chinese society, literary sources, and refugee interviews. While the first three kinds of sources are fairly standard, the last two are only infrequently used by economists and perhaps this is the first treatise on the Chinese economy which really draws heavily on refugee interviews.

The book starts with a brief historical survey of Chinese Communist policy and reliance on market versus non-market mechanisms for resource allocation from 1949 to 1963. This is followed by a survey and analysis of market versus centralized controls in agriculture; the role of wholesale prices and financial incentives in industry; the role of ideology and political control considerations in the control of in-

dustry; the role of wages as allocators in the labour market; and, finally, the role of prices versus administrative mechanism for allocating products in the consumer goods market.

Politics and Economics

The central thesis of his study is that the politics of power, Marxist ideology, and the regime's emphasis on producers' goods industry have all fostered the use of centralized controls in resource allocation. Such centralized controls, however, are not suitable on economic grounds for encouraging agricultural development.

Yet this is the area in which they may be most necessary on political grounds. The reason for this is that, given the backwardness of Chinese agriculture and the low per capita farm output, the primary task is that of increasing output rather than of extracting more of the surplus out of agriculture.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of China's economic history since 1949 is that by the mid-1950's the extraction ceiling seems to have been reached as far as agriculture is concerned. The only time that the ceiling was significantly exceeded was in 1958, with a truly bumper crop.

Therefore every time the Chinese Communists tried to raise the extraction ratio or even to raise the absolute quantity of grain collected from the countryside, they ran into serious economic difficulties and peasant incentive problems, with adverse consequences for farm output.

Most important, when agricultural production declined markedly in the aftermath of the Great Leap, industrial production had to be drastically curtailed as well.

This is in sharp contrast with the Soviet experience. There agricultural

production declined markedly during the collectivization period between 1928 and 1932 and yet industrial production continued to grow. This reflects the differing population-agricultural balance in the Soviet Union as compared to Communist China.

But increasing agricultural output is a task that, as Perkins points out, cannot be readily centralized even in the hands of the head of a single village, much less all the way up to Peking. Raising farm output involves working with about 120 million peasant households, taking account of the vast variety of soils, other natural conditions, cultural variations, and price and other incentives.

In order to foster agricultural development, resource allocation decisions have to be preponderantly delegated to the farm household, or, at most, to a small production team—with the bulk of the increased income retained by them to be allocated between consumption and investment as they see fit.

The natural implication of this is higher consumption, a lower rate of saving, and a much larger portion of saving channelled into agricultural investment.

In a sense this has been, to a greater or lesser extent, official policy in the early '60's. It is perhaps too early yet to tell whether this policy will become a victim of the present "cultural revolution."

This degree of decentralization over resource allocation is undesirable from the *leadership's* point of view on several accounts. First, it undermines the heavy industry emphasis which is the preferred choice of the policy-makers. Second, by raising farm prices, encouraging private plots, encouraging greater peasant initiatives, and giving the peasants greater powers over disposal of their income, it inevitably encourages the development of

"capitalist tendencies" in the countryside and thereby carries with it dangers to political control by the party and by the cadres.

The dilemmas thus created are one aspect of the more general problem outlined in the first part of this review article. Namely, it is another instance of the inherent conflict between the leadership's bias for the use of coercive appeals and the peasantry's preference for remuneration.

Constraints of Power

Viewed in these terms, I wonder whether indeed it is true that, "unlike the governments of most undeveloped countries, the Peking regime has the necessary political power to chart its own course" [Perkins, page 201]. *The regime does, of course, have the political power to chart its own course, but can it assure itself that if and when this political power is applied it will elicit the desired outcomes?*

Moreover, is there not a basic conflict between the intensity with which political power is applied and the economic consequences of these power inputs? Rising political power inputs might lead to declining economic outputs, particularly after a certain point. At best, this statement needs to be qualified to the extent that no regime, and certainly not the Chinese, is capable of operating in a political, psychological, and social vacuum.

The Chinese Communist regime is not only constrained by China's economic backwardness, but its political power is also constrained by the attitudes of the Chinese peasantry and their traditional and conservative outlook.

Planning and Backwardness

Another issue to which Perkins ad-

resses himself is the readiness of the Chinese economy to adapt itself to economic planning and centralized control, and the ease with which such controls can be applied. In essence Perkins finds that precisely because China is industrially underdeveloped the planners have to deal with a smaller number of items, rendering central planning in industry much easier.

This is reinforced by the fact that interdependence in the production and allocation of these commodities is less complex. Moreover, because even the consumer diet is simple, consumption can be essentially controlled by the rationed allocation of a few major consumer goods that constitute a substantial portion of total consumer outlays.

Furthermore, central planning by physical means has been facilitated by China's ability to borrow technology from abroad. If China had to develop her own technology, an entirely different incentive structure would be required to induce industrial firms to engage in research and development, to induce them to adopt innovations, and to render them technologically progressive.

In developing his thesis concerning the relatively low degree of interdependence between different sectors, Perkins stresses in particular the separation between urban and rural areas. This finding is open to misunderstanding. It is perfectly true that the rural sector is not too dependent on the industrial sector and that, given the controlled system of distribution of industrial products, this lack of direct dependence is reinforced.

But the reverse is much less true: the industrial and urban sector of the economy is very much dependent on the rural sector. This is true in spite of the fact that the system of controls is designed to reduce this interdependence.

The reality was most clearly demon-

strated during the Great Leap and its aftermath when a decline in agricultural production led to a decline in industrial production. This happened both because of shortages of raw materials and shortages of the food supply required to provide the minimum nutritional needs of the urban workers and the urban population at large.

Moreover, the declines in agricultural production led to declining exports so that imports had to be curtailed. This, in turn, meant that the imports of capital goods had to be drastically reduced, which then had an additional negative impact on the level of domestic industrial production and domestic industrial expansion.

Perkins correctly points out that while backwardness may facilitate the imposition of centralized controls in industry, certain other factors associated with this backwardness work in the opposite direction. Among these he cites lack of accurate and timely data, lack of a sufficient number of trained managerial personnel, and the size of a country which has 100,000 industrial firms and 120 million peasant households.

Finally, even the technological advantages of backwardness and the ability to borrow technology from more developed countries are somewhat reduced by the fact that this technology may not always be suited to an underdeveloped country. Concretely, in the Chinese case, imported Soviet technology as embodied in complete plant projects did not always lead to optimal resource use.

Prices and Wages

In analysing the scope of the market, Perkins concludes that prices played a minor role in allocating industrial products and in guiding construction projects. At times the role of the market was upgraded even in these sectors. But this was

done, so to speak, through the back door by raising the importance of the profit target as a success indicator for the industrial and construction firms.

Yet the practical importance of this was greatly undermined by the laxity of financial controls prevailing during most of the period with which Perkins deals. Incidentally, one of the most interesting insights generated by Perkins' research is the lack of financial discipline on the part of the industrial firms, the weakness of the banking system, and the inability of the banking system to impose stringent financial controls.

This was in considerable part reinforced by the planners' bias against the use of financial controls and the cadres' bias against relying on price and profit criteria as success indicators.

The market was of much greater significance in agriculture than in industry. But even in agriculture, of course, the market was severely circumscribed by compulsory purchase quotas which were instituted in late 1953. Nevertheless, the free market was still dominant for a wide range of subsidiary products, except for the Great Leap period of 1958-60. During those years the free market was either abolished altogether or was strongly pushed into the background.

Wages in China have not played a significant role as allocators of labour. This is primarily due to the fact that unskilled labour has been in surplus during most of the period, while highly skilled labour is so scarce that the regime has found it necessary to allocate it through administrative means rather than through the market mechanism. As a result, wages perform largely an incentive function rather than a labour allocative one.

Prices, perhaps, are most important in the consumer goods markets where they really play a dominant role. But even

here their importance is qualified by rationing of the major consumer goods items. Certainly the scope in China is much more restricted than in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe today, but not necessarily more confined than in Russia during World War II or even possibly some years of the immediate prewar and postwar periods.

Except for the qualifications noted above, I find Perkins' analysis most convincing. One might perhaps enter some reservations concerning some of his comparisons of the Soviet and Chinese experience, but a detailed discussion of these would carry us well beyond the legitimate scope of this review.

One might also enter another minor reservation about Perkins' use of the term profit taxes. This implies taxes on profits, but actually all of the enterprise profits are appropriated by the state and are carried as revenues in the state budget. The only exception is a small portion of profits

which can be retained by the enterprise under strictly specified conditions and for strictly specified uses.

However, even on this point we are indebted to Perkins for an important finding. For a long time it has been a puzzle as to why turnover taxes have played such an important role in the Soviet case and enterprise profits have been so unimportant there, as compared to China where the reverse has been the case. Perkins' study provides a well-reasoned and well-documented explanation. This is but one of the many examples of the contributions made by this most important work.

ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN is Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan. A pioneer in the study of China's economy, he is the author of several books including *"The National Income of Communist China."*

BOOK NOTES

These brief reviews are of books available at American Libraries in New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Trivandram, Guntur, and Patna.

THE PHYSICS OF SPACE. By Richard Manliffe Sutton. Holt. 1965. 176 pp. This book provides a concise introduction to the fundamental physics of space and to elementary astronomy. Planetary motion, vacuums, man-made satellites, atmospheres of the planets, weightlessness, and radiation in space are some of the subjects covered. Simple experiments and problems illustrate the principles. The book is written for the layman.

THE UNIVERSITY IN TRANSITION (Stafford Little Lecture). By James Alfred Perkins. Princeton. 1966. 89 pp. This lecture by the President of Cornell University is a clear statement of the role of the modern university. Dr. Perkins discusses the three phases of knowledge—its acquisition, transmission, and application—and shows how they correspond to the three missions of the modern university—teaching, research, and public service. Dr. Perkins then examines the problems which the university faces within its own family on campus. In the final part Dr. Perkins discusses the external problems of the university.

WHERE'S THE MELODY?: A Listener's Introduction to jazz. By Martin T. Williams. Pantheon. 1966. 205 pp. This book explains what jazzmen do with a popular melody as they improvise. One chapter is devoted to analyses of the techniques

of improvisations of several popular melodies. Another chapter describes what the composer does in writing a "line" and in indicating a series of harmonies and chord structures on which the players will proceed to improvise. One section gives personal glimpses of such famous jazzmen as Thelonious Monk, Milt Jackson, "Big Joe" Williams, and Jimmy Giuffre. The book should appeal to a wide variety of musicians and the layman.

THE AMAZING SEEDS: Photos by the author. By Ross Elliott Hutchins. Dodd. 1965. 159 pp. The book discusses the great variations among seeds, including how they germinate, travel along the ground, through the air, by ocean currents, their ability to sprout after centuries of dormancy, effects of radiation, uses in cooking, and how to identify them.

JOHN F. KENNEDY ON EDUCATION. Edited by William T. O'Hara. Teachers College. 1966. 305 pp. The Assistant Dean of the University of Connecticut School of Law has compiled a definitive collection of the late President's speeches and writings on education, as a Congressman, Senator, and President. Each selection is preceded by a brief statement of the circumstances under which it was presented and what action, if any,

it initiated. The appendices summarize the education legislation introduced by John F. Kennedy, his recorded votes on aid to education, the education legislation enacted during his brief administration, and other selected acts affecting youth and education which he signed into law.

HELPING HANDS: VOLUNTEER WORK IN EDUCATION. By Cayle Janowitz. University of Chicago. 1965. 125 pp. This book describes volunteers as used in schools in academic programmes for assistance in homework and after-school study centres. The special objective of these academic programmes is to help city children from low-income and poverty backgrounds as part of the war on poverty. This report reviews the growth of volunteer work in education, describes how a study centre is organized, how the children can be helped, who the volunteers are, and specific cases of effectiveness or failure.

AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK. Edited by John Preston Davis. Prentice. 1966. 969 pp. A new reference book presents the history and accomplishments, the statistical character, and cultural nature of the Negro within the United States. History, economics, religion, education, employment opportunities, military service, politics, sports, art, music, and literature are covered.

COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Harold C. Hinton. Houghton. 1966. 327 pp. This book on Chinese Communist foreign policy covers the operations of the Peking Government at the diplomatic level throughout the world, first in background and then by geographic area. Hinton, one of America's leading experts on Red China, has combed all available materials for this study on the impact of Red China on the world scene.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE: THE MODERNIZING OF FARMING. Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Ames, Centre for Agricultural and Economic Development. Iowa State University Press. 1965. 314 pp. Eighteen papers presented at a three-day seminar at Iowa State University cover various phases of agricultural development in emerging countries including planning for agricultural

development. The volume will be of value to administrators and policy workers in developing countries.

THE OLD MAN AT THE RAILROAD CROSSING AND OTHER TALES. By William Maxwell. Knopf. 1966. 174 pp. Only someone almost over-endowed with humanity, humility, and goodness, with a gentle humour and keen, though kindly, perception of human frailties, could have written these tales. Maxwell's writing has a spider web delicacy of once upon a time but the content frequently has a twentieth-century tensile strength.

WAR WITHOUT GUNS: AMERICAN CIVILIANS IN RURAL VIETNAM. By George K. Tanham and Others. Praeger. 1966. 141 pp. This book about the work of the Office of Provincial Operations, a part of the United States Operations Mission in Vietnam, illustrates the contribution to the economic, social, and political development of that country. Three case studies of the work of the Provincial Representatives cover the Delta region, the High Plateau, and coastal Central Vietnam.

DEEP-SEA WORLD: THE STORY OF OCEANOGRAPHY. By Charles Ira Coombs. Morrow. 1966. 256 pp. Provided here is a concise survey of man's daring explorations of the ocean as a vital source of food and other resources for future populations. The first part covers the oceans of the world and relates the findings of the scientists and the explorers of the world. The second part centres around America's many scientific contributions and some of the IGY activities. The final chapter is about "Oceanography as a career."

UNIVERSAL HIGHER EDUCATION. Edited by Earl James McGrath. McGraw. 1966. 258 pp. The goals of universal higher education are the enlargement of knowledge, an open society, the advancement of culture, freedom of opportunity, freedom of conscience and political expression. The commitment to universal higher education presents tangible problems and traditional concepts of higher education will no longer be useful. These attendant implications and issues of universal higher education are expertly analysed in eleven papers presented at a conference held in Puerto Rico in November 1964.

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